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CRIMINAL LAW-PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION OR CONTRACT 
THEORY RESTRICTIONS?-THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING JUDI­
CIAL REVIEW OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION FOUNDED ON UN­
DERLYING CONTRACT PRINCIPLES 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guide­
lines") are a set of sentencing rules which were enacted to require 
all federal judges to sentence defendants found guilty of like crimes 
to similar sentences.! The Guidelines were enacted to combat prej­
udicial and disparate sentencing for like defendants and require 
judges to incarcerate convicted defendants for a congressionally 
predetermined range of months based on a variety of factors.2 The 
court may only reduce the predetermined sentence if the prosecu­
tor files a "substantial assistance" motion requesting a downward 
departure.3 A downward departure is a deviation from the 
1. See infra Part I.B for a further discussion of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
2. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5KU (1998); see also Lisa M. 
Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two 
Districts, 30 CONN. L. REv. 569, 569 (1998) (stating that the Sentencing Guidelines fill a 
need to "humanize" the criminal sentencing procedure and reduce "gross evils" and 
variable sentences that were present prior to the implementation of the Guidelines) 
(quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrrnoUT ORDER vii, x 
(1973)). 
3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5KU (1998). A 5K1.1 motion, 
commonly referred to as a substantial assistance motion, is a motion from the prosecu­
tor notifying the court that the defendant has provided information that assisted the 
prosecutor in apprehending and prosecuting other criminals. See id. This may include 
accomplices, suppliers, or other criminals with whom the defendant has interacted. See 
id. If the prosecutor finds the assistance to be adequate and useful, the prosecutor can 
request that the defendant be given a reduced sentence that is below the statutory mini­
mum (otherwise known as a "downward departure"). See id. The prosecutor accom­
plishes this by filing a substantial assistance motion requesting a downward departure 
on behalf of the defendant. See id. Section 5K1.1 provides as follows: 
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided sub­
stantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who 
has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. 
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons 
149 
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mandatory statutory minimum and ultimately results in a reduction 
in the defendant's overall sentence.4 The court cannot file this mo­
tion independently if the prosecutor decides not to do SO.5 Thus, 
only the prosecutor has the power to file a downward departure 
motion; however, it is entirely within the court's discretion to grant 
or deny the motion.6 The prosecutor will only consider filing a 
downward departure motion if he or she is satisfied that the defend­
ant has provided the prosecutor with substantial assistance. The 
"substantial assistance" given by the defendant must assist the pros­
ecutor in prosecuting or investigating another who has committed a 
criminal offense.7 If the prosecutor deems the defendant's assist-
stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the 
following: 
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defend­
ant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation 
of the assistance rendered; 
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information 	or 
testimony provided by the defendant; 
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance; 
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or 
his family resulting from his assistance; 
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance. 
Id. at 356. 
4. See id. A substantial assistance motion is one of only two ways a defendant 
can deviate from the Guideline sentence. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§§ 5K1.1 and 5K2.0 (1998). Section 5K2.0 permits deviation from the Guidelines if an 
"aggravating circumstance" is present and the facts of the case involve factors not ade­
quately taken into consideration by the drafters of the Guidelines. Id. § 5K2.0, at 357­
58. Judges rarely use an aggravating circumstance as a reason for deviation since Con­
gress created the Guidelines to be very broad and all encompassing. See Cynthia K wei 
Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REv. 105, 107-09 (1994) (stating that the purpose of the 
Guidelines was to increase prosecutorial discretion over sentencing and limit unchecked 
judicial discretion). This leaves little opportunity for judges to encounter a situation 
that is unique to the Guidelines. See id. 
5. See United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating 
that a district court is not permitted to depart downward under § 5K1.1 without a gov­
ernment motion), affd by an equally divided court, 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990). The 
court also rejected the argument that that the government motion requirement was a 
nonbinding statement of public policy. See id.; see also Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 
181 (1992); United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1555 (10th Cir. 1992). 
6. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998) (stating that 
"[u]pon motion of the government . ..") (emphasis added); see also Isaac, 141 F.3d at 
481 (stating that the decision to grant the motion is completely within the court's discre­
tion); see also United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
whether substantial assistance was given is a determination exclusively within the dis­
cretion of the prosecutor, and not the court). 
7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for the factors relevant for a substan­
tial assistance motion. 
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ance truly beneficial and useful in a subsequent investigation or 
prosecution of another, the prosecutor may, but is not compelled 
to, file a substantial assistance motion with the court.8 Once the 
prosecutor files the motion, the court may then· examine several 
factors, such as the significance, usefulness, truthfulness, complete­
ness, and reliability of the information, to ultimately determine 
whether to allow the prosecutor's motion and reduce the sentence 
below the predetermined range.9 If a judge decides to allow the 
motion, the judge must determine the extent of the sentence depar­
ture.1O While evidence of the defendant's assistance may tempt the 
sentencing court to depart from the Guidelines absent the prosecu­
tors filing of a substantial assistance motion, the Guidelines prohibit 
the court from doing SO.l1 Thus, the defendant's only chance at ob­
taining a prison sentence below the statutory minimum is by (a) 
acting in a manner which prompts the prosecutor to file a substan­
tial assistance motion, and (b) having the motion filed before a 
judge who allows the prosecutor's motion and ultimately orders a 
reduced sentence.12 
Defendants enter guilty pleas in nearly ninety percent of cases 
in which the Guidelines are applicable, and most involve some form 
of agreement with the prosecutor.B In many plea agreements, to 
8. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998) (implying that the 
decision to file a substantial assistance motion rests with the prosecutor because § 5K1.1 
states "upon motion of the government") (emphasis added). 
9. See id. Many critics of the Guidelines argue that these vague factors provide 
far too little guidance to the prosecutor and the defendant. See Lee, supra note 4, at 
125 (stating that the lack of uniform prosecutorial policies results in vastly differing 
factorial applications). 
10. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998). The motion im­
poses no mandatory obligation on the court, but rather increases the sentencing options 
available to the court. See United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(stating that "[u]nder the Guidelines, sentencing judges retain discretion to accept or 
reject [the substantial assistance motion] and ... depart from the Guidelines"). 
11. See United States v. Treleaven, 35 F.3d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Isaac, 
141 F.3d at 481 (stating that "[t]he language of § 5KU requires that the government 
make a motion before a district court can depart from the sentencing guidelines range 
in recognition of a defendant's substantial assistance"). 
12. See Lee, supra note 4, at 108 (stating that a judge may not order a reduced 
sentence unless the prosecutor files a substantial assistance motion). The effect of the 
government motion requirement is to give the prosecutor the authority to block a 
downward departure for substantial assistance. See id. at 112. If the prosecutor refuses 
to file the motion, the court cannot, on its own, impose a lower sentence. See id.; see 
also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998). 
13. See Julie Gyurci, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion to Bring a Substantial Assist­
ance Motion Pursuant to a Plea Agreement: Enforcing a Good Faith Standard, 78 MINN. 
L. REV 1253, 1264 (1994). 
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ensure full compliance and cooperation from the defendant, the 
government reserves the "sole discretion"14 to determine whether 
or not the defendant has in fact provided substantial assistance.15 
This reservation of discretion by the prosecutor is an attempt to 
give the defendant the opportunity to obtain a lessened prison sen­
tence in exchange for information regarding other criminal activity. 
A prosecutor may also include a sole discretion clause in a plea 
agreement in order to avoid judicial intervention in the prosecutor's 
decision to file or not file the substantial assistance motion.16 For 
example, a sole discretion clause may be written as follows: "If the 
Government in its sole discretion determines that the defendant has 
fulfilled his obligations of cooperation as set forth [in the rest of the 
plea agreement], at the time of sentencing or within one (1) year 
thereof the government will ... [mJake a motion to allow the Court 
to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines . . . . "17 
Because the defendant has a significant interest in having the 
prosecutor file a substantial assistance motion, the defendant is en­
couraged to assist the prosecutor to his or her fullest ability. Again, 
14. The Restatement of Contracts makes it clear that if the agreement leaves no 
doubt that it is only honest satisfaction that is meant and no more, it will be so inter­
preted, and the condition does not occur if the obligor is honestly, even though unrea­
sonably, dissatisfied. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1979). "In 
such cases the promisor is the sole judge of the quality of work, and his right to reject, if 
in good faith, is absolute and may not be reviewed by court or jury." JOHN D. 
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 503 (3d ed. 1987). Where 
the agreement imposes a personal satisfaction requirement, the issue is whether the 
promisor acted in good faith, and the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the 
bad faith. See id. at 504 n.54. 
15. See United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1993). In Forney, the plea 
agreement stated that "the defendant understands that the determination as to whether 
he has provided 'substantial assistance' rests solely with the government. ..." Id. at 
1495. Similarly, in United States v. Thompson, No. 97-3172, 1998 WL 544313, at *1 
(10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1998) (unpublished opinion), the plea agreement stated "if, in the 
sole opinion of the United States Attorney's office, the defendant's cooperation 
amounts to substantial [assistance], the government will file a motion, pursuant to sec­
tion 5Kl.1 ...." Id. In United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937 (10th Cir. 1997), the plea 
agreement stated that "the discretion and decision to file any motion ... pursuant to 
§ 5K1.1 (downward departure for substantial assistance) rests solely with the govern­
ment." Id. at 938. 
16. See John S. Austin, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion and Substantial Assistance: 
The Power and Authority ofJudicial Review - United States v. Wade, 15 CAMPBELL L. 
REv. 263 (1993). The prosecutor is "uniquely competent" to decide whether to file a 
substantial assistance motion, and therefore that decision is "not well suited to judicial 
review." See id. at 284 (citing United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
The memorialization of sole discretion serves this principle. See id. at 284-85 (discuss­
ing the problems that would exist if the prosecutor did not have sole discretion). 
17. United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 479 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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absent a motion for sentence reduction, a defendant has no chance 
at getting a sentence less than the harsh statutory minimum. Fre­
quently, however, the defendant does everything within his or her 
power to substantially assist the prosecutor, and yet the prosecutor 
still chooses not to file a sentence reduction motion.ls Thus, the 
defendant has no chance of obtaining a sentence below the statu­
tory minimum and is forced to endure the full extent of punish­
ment, regardless of the extent of his or her prosecutorial assistance. 
When the prosecutor refuses to file a substantial assistance mo­
tion, a defendant will usually attempt to challenge the decision by 
filing an interlocutory appeal.19 On appeal, defendants argue that 
they have substantially assisted the government by providing infor­
mation regarding criminal activity, yet have obtained no benefit in 
return.20 The reviewing court must, however, first decide whether it 
has the power to review the prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial 
assistance motion.21 Where the plea agreement explicitly vests the 
prosecutor with "sole discretion" to determine what constitutes 
"substantial assistance," the federal circuit courts have split on the 
issue of whether they have jurisdiction to perform this review. The 
majority of the circuits (hereinafter "the non-reviewing circuits")22 
have held that plea agreements are not contracts, and that a prose­
cutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion is com­
pletely within the prosecutor's discretion, and therefore 
unreviewab1e.23 A minority of circuits (hereinafter "the reviewing 
18. See id. at 480 (stating that while the defendant had met with the prosecutors 
and attempted to reveal all information in his possession, the government still chose not 
to file a § 5K1.1 motion); see also United States v. Certuche, No. 97-1327, 1998 WL 
537778, at *1 (2d Cir. July 29,1998) (unpublished opinion). In Certuche, the defendant 
and his son attempted to reveal all known information, yet the prosecutor remained 
unsatisfied. See id. 
19. See BLACK'S LAW DlcrJONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990), defining interlocutory ap­
peal as: "An appeal of a matter which is not determinable of the controversy, but which 
is necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits." 
20. See United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 984 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
"Burrell contends that his role in [the defendant's] guilty plea constituted substantial 
assistance to the government, and that he was entitled to a downward departure 
notwithstanding the government's failure to move for one. He buttresses his claim by 
recounting the harassment to which he and his family were subjected [to] as a result of 
the public perception, based upon the plea, that he was a 'snitch'''). 
21. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 477, 484 (finding that a district court has jurisdiction to 
determine whether the government's refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion ... is attributable 
to bad faith and, accordingly, in violation of the plea agreement"). 
22. See infra Part II.A for a thorough discussion of the circuits that do not review 
a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion. 
23. See United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937, 938-39 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating 
that absent language obligating the government to file a substantial assistance motion, 
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circuits")24 have held that sole discretion plea agreements are con­
tracts.25 These circuits have held that a court may review the prose­
cutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion using 
contract principles such as good faith, duress, illusory promise, and 
unconscionability.26 Specifically, the reviewing circuits have held 
that even though the prosecution reserves the "sole discretion" to 
decide whether the defendant has provided substantial assistance, 
the court has the power to ensure that the prosecution acted in 
good faith when making that determination.27 
Part I of this Note examines plea bargaining in general,28 in­
cluding the interplay between plea bargaining and the United 
States Federal Sentencing Guidelines.29 Part I also explores the 
role of the prosecutor in the judicial system and the discretionary 
power he or she possesses.30 This Part includes a discussion of an 
important Supreme Court decision that provides a basis for how 
courts should deal with prosecutorial discretion in generaPl 
Lastly, Part I examines two important Supreme Court cases that 
provide the framework around which the issue regarding review­
ability of a prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance 
motion may be resolved.32 Part II of this Note examines the circuit 
reviewability of prosecutorial discretion is only possible if the prosecutor's motivation 
was unconstitutional or "not rationally related to a legitimate government end"); see 
also Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (stating that a prosecutor has 
the power, not a duty to file a 5K1.1 motion, and the prosecutor's decision can be chal­
lenged if it "was based on an unconstitutional motive"). 
24. See infra Part ILB for a thorough discussion of the circuits that do review a 
prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion. 
25. See infra Part II.B for a thorough discussion of contract applicability to plea 
agreements. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 481-83. 
26. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the benefits and detriments of applying 
contract principles in this context. See generally Isaac, 141 F.3d at 481 (finding that plea 
agreements are "contractual in nature and [must] be analyzed under contract-law prin­
ciples") (quoting United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989». 
27. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 484 (stating that the court should call upon the prosecu­
tor to prove it acted in good faith when deciding not to file the substantial assistance 
motion); see also United States v. Imtiaz, 81 F.3d 262, 264 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) 
(stating that "[a] court'may review a prosecutor's refusal to recommend a downward 
departure for substantial assistance to determine if the prosecutor acted in bad faith"). 
28. See infra Part LA for a discussion of plea bargaining principles. 
29. See infra Part LB.1 for a discussion of the interplay between plea bargaining 
and the Sentencing Guidelines. 
30. See infra Part LB.3 for a discussion of the role a prosecutor plays within the 
judicial system. 
31. See infra Part LB.3 for a discussion of the interplay between Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and prosecutorial discretion in general. 
32. See infra Part LB.4 for a discussion of the reviewability of prosecutorial dis­
cretion and United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
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split that has emerged as the courts of appeals have struggled with 
this issue.33 Part III examines the implications of applying contract 
principles to plea agreements, and suggests that sole discretion plea 
agreements are not distinguishable from contracts.34 Finally, Part 
III proposes an alternative method of resolving the issue of review­
ing a prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance mo­
tion by modifying the plea agreement to allow defendants to retain 
certain constitutional rights if they are dissatisfied with the prosecu­
tor's decision.35 
I. THE USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PLEA BARGAINING AND 

SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE MOTIONS 

A. Plea Bargaining and Its Place in the Judicial System 
The plea bargain is a tool with longstanding judicial rootS.36 
Many of the purposes for plea bargaining still exist today, even 
though prosecutors use plea bargaining differently than when the 
judiciary first implemented it. 
1. Common Law Usage and Application 
The common law recognized the practice of "approvement," 
under which an individual accused of a felony could receive a par­
don.37 This practice, which originated in England,38 required an in­
dividual to reveal his or her accomplice and assist with the 
33. See infra Parts II.A and II.B for a detailed discussion of the existing United 
States Circuit Courts of Appeals split. 
34. See infra Parts lILA and III.B for a discussion of contract applicability and 
the potential consequences of this application. 
35. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the consequences of a proposed con­
gressional statutory modification. 
36. See Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargain­
ing?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 757-60 (1998) 
(discussing the longstanding practice of plea bargaining throughout American history); 
see also Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. 
REv. 1,8 (1992) (stating that the "[m]odero [plea bargaining] practice thus has ancient 
roots"). 
37. See Hughes, supra note 36, for a discussion of plea bargaining at common law. 
38. See Justin M. Lungstrum, Note, United States v. Singleton: Bad Law Made in 
the Name ofa Good Cause, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 749, 775 n.25 (1999) ("The doctrine of 
approvement, which 'offered formal pardons to certain classes of fugitive offenders on 
condition that they surrender, confess themselves guilty, and procure the capture and 
conviction of their colleagues,' had been codified in England in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.") (quoting John L. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century 
Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 1,94 (1983». 
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conviction of that accomplice.39 Apart from approvement, which 
had become unpopular by the eighteenth century, there also existed 
an informal practice by which an accused, though not legally enti­
tled to do so, could obtain a pardon by confessing to the act and 
revealing his or her accomplice(s).4o If satisfied with the defend­
ant's assistance, the monarch, or his or her direct servants, would 
grant the plea to the defendant.41 Although this practice of pardon­
ing was often applied in a prejudicial manner,42 both of these early 
English practices served an important function in the judicial sys­
tem prior to the industrial revolution. Namely, because of the lack 
of forensic technology and organized police forces, these methods 
were the only means by which the government could procure infor­
mation and effectively apprehend multiple criminals.43 
2. Modern Usage and Application 
Although the modern plea agreement varies greatly from its 
ancient predecessor, the underlying "bargain" principle remains the 
same.44 Today, only the prosecutor has the power to enter into a 
plea agreement with a defendant, as opposed to earlier times when 
39. See id. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 102 (6th ed. 1990), which defines ap­
provement as: 
[A] practice of criminal prosecution[] by which a person accused of treason or 
felony was permitted to exonerate himself by accusing others and escaping 
prosecution himself. The custom existed only in capital cases, and consisted in 
the accused, called "approver," being arraigned and permitted to confess ... 
or accuse another as his accomplice of the same crime in order to obtain his 
pardon. 
According to the definition of approver, if the approver "failed to convict those he 
accused" of being his accomplices, he was immediately hung. See id. 
40. Lord Mansfield described this informal practice as follows: 
Where the accomplice has made a full and fair confession of the whole truth 
and is admitted as a witness for the crown, the practice is, if he act[s] fairly and 
openly and discover[s] the whole truth, though he is not entitled of right to a 
pardon ... the practice of the court is to stop tl1e prosecution against the 
accomplice, the understanding being that he has an equitable title to a recom­
mendation for the king's mercy. 
The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 600 (1879) (paraphrasing Lord Mansfield in Rex v. 
Rudd, 98 Eng. Rep. 1114,1116 (1775». 
41. See generally id. 
42. Cf Hughes, supra note 36, at 7-8 for a related discussion of plea bargaining in 
Great Britain. 
43. See id. It was "essential to procure [an] accomplice['s] testimony in order to 
track down or build a case against a major criminal." Id. at 7. It was customary to 
prominently offer pardons to accomplices who would come forward to testify and con­
vict co-conspirators. See id. It was also common to offer cash payments to witnesses 
who came forward and testified about the illegal act. See id. at 7-8. 
44. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
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it was the monarch who acted as prosecutor and judge.45 In mod­
ern times, the accused gives up fundamental rights in exchange for a 
lessened sentence, or at least the possibility of a lessened sen­
tence.46 In return, the prosecutor secures a conviction and gains 
valuable information about other criminal activity.47 In The Whis­
key Cases,48 the United States Supreme Court approved of plea 
bargaining, so long as the prosecutor did not force the defendant to 
incriminate himself.49 While the Supreme Court has approved of 
plea bargaining in general, it has not specifically created a standard 
or test to determine how much information the defendant must di­
vulge in order to obtain a reduced sentence or "downward depar­
ture."50 Presently, the determination of the adequacy of 
information is made entirely by the prosecutor.51 
YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992). "Plea bargains are, as the name suggests, bargains; [and] 
it seems natural to argue that they should be regulated and evaluated accordingly." Id. 
45. See Guidorizzi, supra note 36 for a general discussion of the origins and his­
tory of plea bargaining. See People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Mich. 1988) (stat­
ing that "the police possess neither the authority to withhold prosecution nor to grant 
immunity, [and] no formal system exists by which to check the potentially unbridled 
discretion the police would possess if allowed to make binding promises precluding 
prosecution"; only the prosecutor has such power). 
46. The accused, in exchange for a plea, may give up such valuable constitutional 
rights as the right to stand trial, face one's accuser, proclaim one's innocence, and de­
fend oneself. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1998). 
47. See Jean Choi DeSombre, Comparing the Notions of the Japanese and the U.S. 
Criminal Justice System: An Examination of Pretrial Rights of the Criminally Accused in 
Japan and the United States, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 103, 120 (1995). The author 
states: 
In ideal plea bargaining, the defendant and the state are on a level playing 
field and both parties benefit by an arrangement reached through a plea bar­
gain: the defendant, in exchange for providing the prosecutor with valuable 
information, Le., a confession to the crime, receives a sentence or charge re­
duction and the state in return for its leniency disposes of the case quickly and 
thereby saves resources. 
Id. 
48. 99 U.S. 594 (1879). 
49. See id. at 596. 
50. See generally id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5Kl.1 (1998). 
51. See United States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 884 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In the ab­
sence of arbitrariness or unconstitutional motivation ... we must abide by the prosecu­
tor's decision."); see also Austin, supra note 16, at 284-85 for a discussion of the 
limitations placed on judicial review of prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor plays 
an integral part in the judicial system, and therefore is allowed vast discretion. See id. 
at 279-80. The prosecutor has the discretion to prosecute, decide what charges to press, 
obtain a search warrant, choose the witnesses to be presented to the grand jury, decide 
whether to seek joint trial of persons or offenses, and whether to enter into a plea 
bargain with the defendant. See id. at 280. 
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3. Benefits of Plea Agreements 
A defendant convicted of a federal crime faces fairly strict con­
gressionally predetermined sentences that judges are restricted 
from modifying. 52 The United States Constitution confers upon 
every criminal defendant basic constitutional rights. 53 These rights 
include the right to face his or her accuser, the right to remain si­
lent, the right not to self-incriminate, the right to be heard, the right 
to a jury of his or her peers, and the right to plead not guilty, just to 
name a few.54 Furthermore, the defendant has the right to force the 
prosecutor to move forward with trial and prove his or her case 
against the defendant.55 In addition, although charged with a crimi­
nal act, the defendant still retains his or her freedom to contract.56 
Thus, the defendant may attempt to enter into a binding plea agree­
ment with the prosecutor to avoid these strict penalties.57 
Moreover, "[t]he prosecutor has the right to seek the maxi­
mum sentence for the maximum offense that can be proven at 
trial," within ethical boundaries.58 Consequently, a defendant has 
an incentive to bargain with the prosecutor. "If the freedom to ex­
change entitlements59 were denied altogether in the allocation of 
52. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998). 
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides the following: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer­
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence[sic]. 
Id. 
54. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 362 (1993); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 
78, 112 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). 
55. See United States v. Murphy, 65 F.3d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that a 
plea bargain deters a defendant from exercising his constitutional right to proceed with 
trial and forces the prosecutor to prove his case) (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357, 362-64 (1978». 
56. See United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that a 
defendant's right to contract is constitutional). 
57. See generally Anjili Soni & Michael E. McCann, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review 
of Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas, 84 GEO. L.J. 1039 
(1996)("There is no constitutional right to plea bargain. However, prosecutors must 
comply with equal protection requirements when ... plea bargaining. Rule 11( e) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the conduct of the government and the 
defendant during plea negotiations ... and authorizes plea agreements ...."). 
58. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1914. 
59. Entitlement is defined as the "[r]ight to benefits, income or property which 
may not be abridged without due process." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532 (6th ed. 
1990). 
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criminal punishment, defendants would not have the option of 
pleading guilty in exchange for foregoing the burden and expense 
of a full trial. That is, not only plea bargains, but unbargained-for 
guilty pleas would be forbidden."60 Therefore, a defendant retains 
the right to bargain, make offers, and accept offers, even though 
other rights may be restricted or taken away upon arrest.61 The 
prosecutor acquires certain rights when he or she enters into plea 
negotiations with the defendant.62 
Plea agreements have societal importance beyond the interests 
of the individual parties.63 For example, a plea agreement provides 
a method by which a prosecutor can dramatically increase the rate 
of successful prosecutions because whenever the defendant pleads 
guilty, the prosecutor avoids a possible "not guilty" jury verdict.64 
Furthermore, the prosecutor can avoid expending significant en­
ergy, time, and costs by avoiding trial. In tum, the plea agreement 
dramatically reduces the overburdened federal dockets.65 When a 
prosecutor adds a substantial assistance element to the traditional 
plea agreement, the prosecution may also obtain valuable informa­
tion about other criminal activity.66 Criminal defendants also bene­
fit from the use of plea agreements because pleading guilty to a 
lesser offense allows defendants to avoid the maximum penalty for 
their accused crime and the stigma often related to that penalty.67 
60. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1913. 
61. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that although 
the defendant retains many rights after arrest, a person loses some rights to personal 
privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment); see also Yale H. Yee, Note, 
Criminal DNA Data Banks: Revolution for Law Enforcement or Threat to Individual 
Privacy?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 461, 476 (1995) (discussing Jones v. Murray and the con­
stitutionality of collecting blood samples from convicted felons in order to create a 
DNA database). 
62. The prosecutor has the right to accept or deny the final draft of the plea 
agreement. See Austin, supra note 16, at 280-81. . 
63. See Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
1121, 1129 (1998) ("A settlement is societally efficient, compared to the alternative of 
requiring each party to keep what they have; namely, their chance of winning at trial, 
with all attendant risks and benefits."). 
64. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1915 ("Plea bargaining provides a 
means by which prosecutors can obtain a larger net return from criminal convictions, 
holding resources constant."). 
65. See id.; see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (noting that plea agreements have become a necessity in today's adminis­
tration of justice). See infra Part 1.A.4 for further discussion of the societal importance 
of plea bargaining. 
66. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1915. 
67. See id. By utilizing the plea bargain system, "[c]riminal defendants, as a 
group, are able to reduce the risk of the imposition of maximum sanctions." Id. 
160 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:149 
Likewise, the defendant gains the possibility of a sentence reduc­
tion below the congressionally proscribed minimum sentence if he 
substantially assists the prosecutor.68 
Thus, a plea agreement generally involves two parties who may 
each benefit from the cooperation of the other.69 Either party can 
propose a possible plea agreement, but only the prosecutor has the 
power of acceptance,1o Therefore the ultimate decision to enter 
into a plea agreement rests with the prosecutor.71 Because this 
gives the prosecutor the overall bargaining advantage, the prosecu­
tor begins negotiations with the upper hand.72 Once the prosecutor 
decides that a plea agreement could benefit the government, the 
prosecutor will usually make the initial offer to the defendant.73 
After the initial offer is made, negotiating the major terms of the 
plea agreement can be difficult for the defendant because of the 
defendant's constant inferior bargaining position.74 Ultimately the 
parties may reach a mutual agreement based on offer and accept­
ance.75 Some courts classify this transaction as contractual in na­
ture, irrespective of its criminal context, and allow contract 
enforceability doctrines to apply,16 These courts have reasoned 
68. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998). 
69. See Eric S. Baker, Note, Double Jeopardy and Its Application to Broken Plea 
Agreements, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 127,137 (1989). "Plea agreements offer benefits to both 
the state and the defendant. Courts recognize the advantages of plea bargaining in 
easing court dockets and aiding in a more effective judicial system." Id. Thus, it is 
crucial to require that plea agreements be honored in order to ensure that both parties 
will continue to derive a benefit. See id. 
70. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargain in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. 
REv. 1471, 1478 (1993) (stating that "[o]ne important feature of prosecutors' monop­
sony power is the ability, in the presence of the judge, to dictate the [final] price, that is, 
the terms, of plea agreements"); see generally Roland Acevedo, Note, Is a Ban on Plea 
Bargaining an Ethical Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 
FORDHAM L. REv. 987 (1995). 
71. See Acevedo, supra note 70, at 994 (stating that the prosecution has absolute 
control over the entire plea bargaining process). 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. See Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 
HARV. L. REv. 564, 579 (1977) (stating that "the right to reject the proposed plea bar­
gain is largely chimerical. Fear of heavier sentence after trial and deference to advice of 
defense counsel might lead defendants to accept virtually all plea agreements"); see also 
United States v. Bradbury, 189 F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the "Govern­
ment ... enjoys significant advantages in bargaining power"). 
75. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1082 (6th ed. 1990), which defines offer and 
acceptance in a bilateral contract as "the two elements which constitute mutual assent, a 
requirement of the contract." 
76. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that ex­
change of consideration between parties constitutes a binding enforceable agreement); 
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that because plea bargains are contractual in nature, it is appropri­
ate to analyze the agreements using contract principles.77 
4. 	 The Modern Judicial System's Dependence Upon Plea 
Bargaining 
Today, the disposition of criminal charges by an agreement be­
tween the prosecutor and the defendant is an essential element of 
the administration of justice.78 Plea bargaining agreements are 
highly desirable because they offer prompt final dispositions of 
most criminal cases.79 Plea bargaining enhances whatever chances 
the guilty have of receiving a lesser sentence.so Most criminal pros­
ecutions are settled without a trial because both sides feel the bene­
fits of plea bargains outweigh going to trial. 81 Even if a defendant is 
clearly guilty, and the prosecution has overwhelming evidence, the 
plea saves the resources of the legal system and allows the prosecu­
tor to secure a conviction without expending the time and energy 
required for trial.82 In plea bargaining, the "rule of law is invariably 
sacrificed to the rule of convenience. "83 Plea bargaining has, in 
see also United States v. Kahn, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that 
"[c]ooperation agreements, like plea bargains, may usefully be interpreted with princi­
ples borrowed from the law of contract"); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713 
(2d Cir. 1990) (stating that "[c]ooperation agreements, like plea bargains, are inter­
preted according to principles of contract law"). 
77. See supra note 76; see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1968 ("The time 
has come to put rights talk to one side and view plea bargaining through the lens of 
contract."); Julie Lumpkin, Note, The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish That a 
Defendant Has Materially Breached a Plea Agreement, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1059, 1067 
(1987) (stating that "[c]ourts that have addressed plea bargain disputes have used to 
some extent a contract law framework and terminology to analyze and describe plea 
agreements"). 
78. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (stating that "[i]f every 
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the State and the Federal Govern­
ment would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities"). 
79. See generally, Holly L. Nickerson, Note, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 741, 746 
(1998) (" 'The criminal justice system now disposes of virtually all cases of serious crime 
through plea bargaining."') (citation omitted). "Further, '[g]iven the prevalence of its 
use, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court of the United States has labeled plea 
bargaining "as an essential component of the administration of justice."'" Id. (citation 
omitted). 
80. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1998) (listing 5Kl.1 as 
one of the very few ways to deviate from the rigid Guideline sentencing grid). 
81. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1915 (observing that prosecutors benefit 
by obtaining larger net returns from criminal convictions and conserving resources, 
while defendants reduce the risk of having to serve maximum sentences). 
82. See Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 50, 53-56 (1968). 
83. 	 Id. at 85. 
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fact, become a necessity because of the overwhelming number of 
defendants and lack of processing resources.84 
Prior to 1987, if a court sentenced a defendant to prison, it was 
virtually impossible to predict the sentence he would receive be­
cause of the judge's use of subjective criteria in formulating 
sentences.85 Pre-Guideline judges were free to utilize any factors 
they deemed relevant to sentence a defendant, such as the of­
fender's personality, social background, motivation for criminal 
conduct, and the potential for effective correctional treatment.86 
Such broad discretion led to non-uniform sentencing throughout 
the federal court system. In an effort to curb inconsistent 
sentences, Congress created the Sentencing Guidelines.87 
B. The Sentencing Guidelines 
Prior to an objective system of sentencing guilty defendants, 
the courts could use virtually any factor about the defendant to in­
fluence their sentencing decisions.88 "This resulted in a wide range 
84. See id. at 54-55. 
85. See Karen Bjorkman, Note, Who's the Judge? The Eighth Circuit's Struggle 
with Sentencing Guidelines and the Section 5KI.I Departure, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 
731, 734-35 (1992). 
86. See id. 
87. See id. at 736 (stating that the Guidelines were conceived to further the crea­
tion of an honest and uniform sentencing procedure). Between the mid-1920's and the 
mid-1970's there was less need for plea bargains because the incarceration rate was 
remarkably low, averaging approximately 110 prisoners per 100,000 United States citi­
zens. See Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of u.s. Prison Populations Revis­
ited, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 743, 743 (1993); see also People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 413-14 
(Cal. 1970) (stating that the judicial system depends on the existence and usage of plea 
bargaining to function). Over the past two decades the prison population rate has in­
creased dramatically. In 1991, federal and state correctional facilities housed 823,414 
inmates, an increase of 150% in eleven years, or 310 sentenced prisoners per 100,000 
United States citizens. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 1991 (1992). Overall, these 
numbers far exceed incarceration capacity in state and federal facilities. See id. at 7. 
Therefore, it is in the judicial system's best interest to reduce the number of prisoners 
and the duration of their incarceration. But see generally Peter Arenella, Rethinking the 
Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideolo­
gies,72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983)(arguing that plea bargains undercut the moral aspects of 
crirninallaw because private party compromises destroy any notion of an objective soci­
etal determination of moral guilt, regardless of the fact that the American judicial sys­
tem is based on this notion). 
88. See S. REp No. 98-225, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3221; see also Ryan M. Zenga, Note, Retroactive Law or Punishment for a New Of­
fense- The Ex Post Facto Implications ofAmending the Statutory Provisions Governing 
Violations of Supervised Release, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 499, 502-03 (1997) (stating 
that "[b]ecause sentencing laws [prior to the enactment of the Guidelines] provided 
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of sentences for defendants who had committed very similar crimes, 
and [this disparity] was identified by Congress as a primary justifi­
cation for changing the· system."89 To overcome judicial biases 
against defendants and to permit sentencing based wholly on objec­
tive criteria, Congress created the Sentencing Guidelines.90 
1. How the Guidelines Work to Promote Consistency 
Before the implementation of the Guidelines in 1984, plea 
agreements allowed defendants to avoid the virtual free reign fed­
eral district courts possessed regarding sentencing.91 "For almost a 
century, the Federal Government employed ... a system of indeter­
minate sentencing" in which statutes specified penalties for only a 
small number of crimes.92 Other statutes generally gave the sen­
tencing judge wide discretion to decide whether to incarcerate the 
offender and for how long, whether to fine him and how much, or 
whether to impose some lesser restraint, such as probation.93 
This indeterminate sentencing system exemplified Congress' 
desire to rehabilitate defendants, rather than punish them.94 Con-
little guidance, federal sentencing judges were 'left to apply [their] own notions of the 
purposes of sentencing' ") (citation omitted). 
89. Zenga, supra note 88, at 503 (citing S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38, reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N 3221). 
90. See Antoinette Marie Tease, Downward Departures for Substantial Assistance: 
A Proposal for Reducing Sentencing Disparities Among Codefendants, 53 MONT. L. 
REv. 75, 76-77 (1992). The purpose of the Guidelines is to "'enhance the ability of the 
criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system.'" 
Id. (quoting Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, Part A-Introduction, at 1.2). 
91. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) (finding that a sen­
tence imposed by a federal district judge is generally not subject to review and may be 
based on independent factors deemed relevant by the judge). 
. 92. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). Under this system, "[t]he 
actual period of imprisonment [was ultimately] based on the offender's ... progress, as 
determined by a parole board." Bjorkman, supra note 85, at 734; see also Zenga, supra 
note 88, at 502-03. Parole permits a conditional release from incarceration and allows 
the parolee to serve the remainder of his or her sentence outside of an institution. See 
Thomas v. Arizona State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 79, 81 (Ariz. 1977). In 
contrast, probation is a sentence imposed whereby the criminal is not institutionalized, 
but rather placed under the supervision of a probation officer. See State v. Fields, 686 
P.2d 1379, 1387 (Haw. 1984). 
93. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. According to the Court: 

Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge to 

determine what the sentence should be within the customarily wide range so 
selected. This broad discretion was further enhanced by the power later 
granted the judge to suspend the sentence and by the resulting growth of an 
elaborate probation system. 
Id. at 364. 
94. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). In Williams, the United 
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gress referred to this system of sentencing as the "rehabilitation 
model."95 Under this system, Congress would enact criminal stat­
utes; sentencing judges would impose sentences within a defined 
permissible statutory range; and the Parole Commission96 would 
determine the actual length of the defendant's sentence.97 There 
was no requirement that the judge specifically state any reason for 
the chosen sentence in the record.98 Thus, judges could consider 
factors about the defendant that were unrelated to the crime and 
impose their own notions of justice.99 This broad discretion eventu­
ally resulted in "demonstrably disparate treatment of similarly situ­
ated [defendants]."loo Although the Supreme Court had praised 
the degree of latitude given to trial judges,lOl the Court has criti-
States Supreme Court endorsed the intermediate model of sentencing and stated that 
"[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of ... criminal [sentencing]. Refor· 
mation and rehabilitation of offenders have become [the] important goals of criminal 
jurisprudence." Id. 
95. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3221; see also Zenga, supra note 88, at 502. 
96. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1117 (6th ed. 1990), which defines parole 
commission as "[t]he state and federal administrative bodies empowered to decide 
whether inmates shall be conditionally released from prison before completion of their 
sentences. " 
97. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223. The 
Parole Commission would then have the ultimate responsibility of setting a release date 
upon a determination that the prisoner was rehabilitated. 
98. See Fisher, infra note 99, at 745. Because judges were not required to memo­
rialize their reasons for sentencing, '''[o]ne judge may sentence in order to rehabilitate, 
another to deter the offender ... from committing a similar crime, a third to incapaci­
tate, while a fourth may sentence simply to 'punish."" Steve Y. Koh, Note, Reestablish­
ing the Federal Judge's Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109, 1115 (1992) (quoting 
PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM viii 
(1977». "The pre-Guidelines process encouraged the presentation of [many] legitimate 
viewpoints." Id. 
99. See Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination ofEmerging Depar­
ture Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 
3-4 (1991); see also David Fisher, Fifth Amendment-Prosecutorial Discretion Not Ab­
solute: Constitutional Limits on Decision Not to File Substantial Assistance Motions, 83 
J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 744, 745 (1993) (stating that disparate treatment was due 
to the "unfettered discretion" granted to the judges in determining sentences, which 
allowed them to implement their own individual principles). 
100. See Selya & Kipp, supra note 99, at 4. 
101. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949). According to the 
Court: 
A sentencing judge is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within 
fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of 
punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant-if 
not essential-to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of 
the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and 
characteristics. 
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cized the system for allowing disparate treatment of similarly situ­
ated individuals.102 
In addition to the mounting criticism of disparate sentencing 
outcomes, theoretical questions about the effectiveness of the reha­
bilitation model caused many courts to strongly challenge the inde­
terminate sentencing system.103 After all, the purpose of the system 
was to allow sentencing judges to work with prosecutors and parole 
officers to determine the most effective way to rehabilitate the de­
fendant.104 Although the rehabilitative model allowed judges to in­
dividually tailor each sentence to best fit the individual defendant, 
rehabilitation soon fell into irreparable disfavor with the public. IDS 
As the philosophy behind the rehabilitative model was ques­
tioned,l06 courts began examining and applying the retributive 
model of sentencing.107 This philosophical change away from the 
intermediate system resulted in the belief that incarceration ought 
to serve retributive goals as opposed to rehabilitative goals. lOB 
Although judges became less concerned with rehabilitation, it was 
eventually found that the retributive sentencing was sporadic and 
unpredictable. 
Calls for limits on judicial discretion in sentencing prompted 
Congress to enact the Sentence Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act").109 
The Act authorized the creation of the United States Sentencing 
Id. at 247. 
102. The Supreme Court recognized that disparate treatment of similarly situated 
individuals led Congress to create sentencing guidelines. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 312 n.35 (1987). 
103. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-67 (1989) (finding that in 
fact, 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) rejects rehabilitation, and states that imprisonment "should 
serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals"). 
104. See id. at 363. 
105. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 
45 STAN. L. REv. 523, 555-56 (1993) (stating that "the belief that judges (or anyone 
else) can impose sentences to rehabilitate has fallen into disfavor. While many continue 
to think that we should try to reform offenders once punishment has been fixed under 
an independent rationale, any 'diagnosis' of the prisoner made at sentencing is an un­
sound basis for determining the severity of punishment") (citation omitted); see also 
Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent 
Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 552 
(1978) ("Even if the state could achieve its rehabilitative objectives far more often then 
it does, we have become doubtful that an offender's wrongdoing justifies a broad as­
sumption of governmental power of his personality. Moreover, almost every means of 
rehabilitating criminals has been tried, and almost nothing seems to work."). 
106. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366. 
107. See id. at 367. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. at 366-67. 
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Commission (the "Commission"), which was responsible for 
promulgating a set of objective sentencing guidelines.110 The Act 
was initially included in Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Con­
trol Act of 1984.111 Specifically, the Commission sought to craft 
guidelines designed to: (1) provide certainty and fairness; (2) avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar 
criminal records who have been found guilty of similar criminal 
conduct; and (3) maintain sufficient flexibility to permit individual­
ized sentences when warranted.112 
The Guidelines require a judge to proceed through a seven­
step process in order to determine a sentence.113 This seven-step 
110. See u.s. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUALCh. 1, pt. A, at 1 (1998); see also 
G. Adam Schweickert III, Note, Third·Party Cooperation: A Welcome Addition to Sub­
stantial Assistance Departure Jurisprudence, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1451 (1998) (stat­
ing that the goal of the Act was to '''[e]stablish sentencing policies and practices for the 
Federal criminal justice system that ... [would promote overall fairness]"') (quoting 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1837,2018). 
111. See The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report on the Operation of the 
Guideline System and Short Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of Incarcer­
ation, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 236, 98 
Stat. 1837, 2033 (1984). 
112. See 28 U.S.C § 991 (1994), which states the following: 
(a) There is established as an independent commission in the judicial branch 
of the United States a United States Sentencing Commission which shall 
consist of seven voting members and one nonvoting member . . . . 
(b) The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to­
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal jus­
tice system that­
(A) 	assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in 
section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code; 
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentenc­
ing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend­
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggra­
vating factors not taken into account in the establishment of gen­
eral sentencing practices; and 
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement 	in knowledge of 
human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process; and 
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, pe­
nal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of 
sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States 
Code. 
Id.; see also Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role of Substantial 
Assistance Departures in Combating Ultra-Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REv. 799, 801 (1994) 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)(1999»; Schweickert, supra note 110, at 1451. 
113. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (1998) (discussing the 
application instructions in general); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERI­
ALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 44 (1994). See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentenc­
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process includes a calculation that takes into account all factors 
deemed relevant by the Commission.n4 Some factors, like the use 
of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime, will add to the 
sentence, while other factors, such as remorse, will allow a reduc­
tion in the sentence.115 The Commission created consistency by 
providing a narrow range of sentences from which a judge could 
choose when sentencing a defendant with a given set of criminal 
characteristics, thereby reducing judicial discretion.116 
One factor that the sentencing judge may take into account 
when formulating a sentence is the defendant's "acceptance of re­
sponsibility."117 If the defendant admits to the crime and takes full 
responsibility for his or her share of the criminal act, the judge may 
use that admission in a sentence reduction calculation.118 The ac­
ceptance of responsibility factor is separate and distinct from "sub­
stantial assistance."119 The acceptance of responsibility entitles the 
defendant to no more than a two-level reduct jon within the pre­
scribed sentencing range,120 whereas substantial assistance can re­
sult in a far more significant downward departure and a sentence 
far below the statutory minimum, regardless of acceptance of re­
sponsibility.121 The categorization of a statement as substantial 
ing Guidelines and the Key Comprises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 
(1988) (discussing the workings of the Guidelines). 
114. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.1 (1998); see also 
DRESSLER, supra note 113, at 44; Breyer, supra note 113, at 6-7. 
115. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 1Bl.1(c) (1998) (stating that 
adjustments in sentencing can be made for factors relating to the victim, the defendant's 
role in the crime, and obstruction of justice); see also Fisher, supra note 99, at 746-48. 
116. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.1 (1998); see 
also Fisher, supra note 99, at 746-47. Compare these judicial limitations to pre-guide­
line sentencing where the judge was free to determine which, if any, of the defendant's 
characteristics would be taken into account. See supra note 99 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the broad discretion given to sentencing judges prior to the enact­
ment of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
117. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.1(e) (1998) (allowing for 
an adjustment "as appropriate for the defendant's acceptance of responsibility"). 
118. See id. § 3El.l. The Comments to section 3El.1 define acceptance of re­
sponsibility as "(a) truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of convic­
tion, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for 
which the defendant is accountable ... ; b) voluntary termination or withdrawal from 
criminal conduct or associations; (c) VOluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudica­
tion of guilt ...." Id. 
119. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1 with § 5Kl.l. 
120. See U.S. SENTENONG GUIDELINES MANuAL § 3El.1(a) (1998) (stating that 
"[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, 
decrease the offense level by 2 levels"). See infra note 124 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of "levels." 
12l. See Daniel J. Sears, Practice Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Bar­
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assistance as opposed to acceptance of responsibility can literally 
mean the difference between serving life in prison and serving 15 to 
20 months in prison.122 Thus, a defendant has a significant interest 
in obtaining a substantial assistance motion from the prosecutor.123 
More specifically, the Guidelines involve a grid that contains 
"forty-three offense levels on its vertical axis and six criminal his­
tory categories on its horizontal axis," for a total of 258 sentencing 
ranges.124 There is one sentencing range for "each possible combi­
nation of offense level and criminal history category."125 This sys­
tem virtually removes all discretion from the judge because the 
judge is forced to sentence within a very narrow range of congres­
sionally mandated sentences.126 
In Mistretta v. United States,127 the plaintiff challenged the con­
stitutionality of the Guidelines on the grounds that they (1) 
amounted to excessive delegation of legislative power, and (2) were 
a violation of the separation of powers principle.128 After a lengthy 
evaluation of the issues (and a dissent by Justice Scalia), the 
Supreme Court held that the Guidelines were constitutional be­
cause there was no excessive delegation of legislative power and 
therefore no violation of the separation of powers principle.129 
a. Legislative history 
The common law distributed federal sentencing among the 
gaining for Freedom, 22 COLO. LAW 485, 485-86 (1993) (stating that it is not possible to 
argue that taking responsibility will compensate for a possible lack of a substantial 
assistance motion because the sentencing rewards are not comparable). 
122. See id. at 487. 
123. See id. at 488-89. 
124. See Selya & Kipp, supra note 99, at 6; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE­
LINES MANUAL, Sentencing Table (1998). The grid sentences range from 0-6 months to 
life imprisonment. See id. 
125. See Selya & Massaro, supra note 112, at 801; see also Selya & Kipp, supra 
note 99, at 6. 
126. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Sentencing Table (1998); see 
also Selya & Massaro, supra note 112, at 801-03; Selya & Kipp, supra note 99, at 6-8. 
127. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
128. See id. at 370. The United States Supreme Court has "long insisted that 'the 
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution' 
mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another 
Branch." Id. at 371-72 (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892». The Constitu­
tion provides that "[a]lliegislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States." U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 1. 
129. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384 (stating that the petitioner's fears about erod­
ing structural protections appear "to be 'more smoke than fire,' and do not compel us to 
invalidate Congress' considered scheme for resolving the seemingly intractable di­
lemma of excessive disparity in criminal sentencing"). 
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three branches of the United States government.13o The Sentencing 
Reform Act!3! established the United States Sentencing Commis­
sion (the "Commission")!32 as an independent part of the Judicial 
Branch of the United States133 "to promulgate guidelines establish­
ing sentencing ranges for different categories of federal offenses 
and defendants."!34 The Commission attempted to compile a list of 
goals based on this congressional objective, yet philosophical 
problems arose concerning the Commission members' "differing 
perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment."!35 Some 
members of the Commission argued that an "appropriate punish­
ment should be defined primarily on the basis of the moral princi­
ple of 'just desserts.' "136 Other members felt that punishment 
should primarily be imposed on the basis of "practical 'crime con­
trol' considerations."!37 For now, the Commission has sought to re­
solve this philosophical difference by applying an empirical 
approach that uses data-estimating factors utilized by the existing 
sentencing system as a starting point.138 
130. See Kirk D. Houser, Comment, Downward Departures: The Lower Envelope 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 31 DUQ. L. REv. 361, 363 & n.20 (1993) (stating 
that "Congress defined the maximum sentence, the district judge imposed either proba­
tion or a sentence within a statutory range, and a parole official of the Executive 
Branch eventually determined the actual duration of imprisonment"). 
131. 28 U.S.c. §§ 991-998 (1984) (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984). 
132. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998); see also John 
M. Dick, Note, Allowing Sentence Bargains to Fall Outside of the Guidelines Without 
Valid Departures: It Is Time for the Commission to Act, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1020 
(1997) ("All members are appointed by the President [of the United States] 'by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate,' and they are 'subject to removal ... by the 
President only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office ...."') (quoting 28 U.S.c. 
§ 991(a)(1994 & Supp. II 1996». 
133. See Houser, supra note 130, at 363. In creating the Commission, Congress 
did not delegate excessive legislative power, but instead, constitutionally called "upon 
the accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating policy on a 
matter uniquely within [the expertise] of judges." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412. 
134. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 195, (1992). 
135. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENT 1.3 (1987). 
136. Id. (stating that under this principle, "punishment should be scaled to the 
offender's culpability" and the harms resulting from the criminal act. "Thus, if the de­
fendant is less culpable, the defendant deserves less punishment"). 
137. Id. (stating that "[d]efendants sentenced under this scheme should receive 
the punishment that most effectively lessens the likelihood of future crime, either by 
deterring others or incapacitating the defendant"). 
138. See id. at 1.4. Using the empirical system, the Commission has analyzed data 
drawn from 10,000 pre-sentence investigations in order to determine which distinctions 
are important in sentencing. See id. This approach has allowed the Commission to 
create a condensed list of relevant distinctions that comprise the separate Guideline 
factors. See id. The empirical system is considered a compromise between the "just 
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The Act attempted to incorporate all of the Commission's 
goals139 into an objective empirical system.140 After a period of in­
tensive review the Commission issued initial guidelines that took 
effect on November 1, 1987.141 The Act further mandated that the 
Commission study the impact and implementation of the Guide­
lines.142 Congress intended for the impact evaluation to focus on 
data for the four-year period immediately following the implemen­
tation of the first draft of the Guidelines.143 The governing statute, 
however, did not anticipate two important developments that sub­
stantially retarded the rate at which the Guidelines went into use.144 
First, the Act did not envision that, while the Guidelines technically 
became law in November 1987, constitutional challenges would pre­
vent consistent nationwide application until January 1989.145 Sec­
ond, when Congress established the effective date for the Act, it 
contemplated that the Guidelines would apply to all sentencing 
proceedings occurring on the date after the Guidelines took effect, 
but not to cases already in progress.146 The second problem devel­
oped after the Commission reviewed the considerable legal 
problems stemming from the implementation of mandatory Guide­
lines in conjunction with the abolishment of parole and "good 
time"147 credits.148 The Department of Justice and the Commission 
advised Congress that a clear "bright line" rule was preferable to 
desserts" and crime control philosophies because both camps recognize the wisdom of 
looking to those distinctions that judges and legislators have made over time. See id. 
These are distinctions that the judicial community believes to be important from either 
a crime-control or moral perspective. See id. 
139. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Commis­
sion's goals; see also Houser, supra note 130, at 364. 
140. See supra note 138 and accompanying text for a discussion of the empirical 
system. 
141. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A 
REpORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINE SYSTEM AND SHORT TERM IMPACTS 
ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRE­
TION AND PLEA BARGAINING 1 (1991) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES REPORT]. 
142. See id. Congress was interested in evaluating the repercussions the Guide­
lines had on the justice system to ensure justice and fairness were best being served. 
See id. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. The Supreme Court held that the Guidelines are constitutional in 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). 
146. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES REpORT, supra note 141, at 1. 
147. Good time credit is "awarded for good conduct and reduces [the] period of 
sentence which [the] prisoner must spend in prison although it does not reduce the 
period of the sentence itself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990). 
148. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES REpORT, supra note 141, at 1. 
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the vague language that stated that the new Act and the Guidelines 
would apply only to offenses committed after the November 1,1987 
effective date,149 Consequently, in the Sentencing Act of 1987, 
Congress recognized and attempted to rectify the potential problem 
by "creating a more gradual, phased-in implementation scheme 
pursuant to which the guidelines are applied to post-effective date 
offenses as they are processed through the criminal justice 
system."150 
Although the statutory purpose of the Guidelines as stated in 
the statutory text provides some insight into the impact the Guide­
lines have on sentencing, it is important to explore the purpose of 
the Guidelines and Congress' objective in creating them. 
b. Congressional intent 
Prior to the Guidelines' enactment, hearings before the Sub­
committee on Criminal Justice indicated various sentencing dispari­
ties and inconsistencies. For instance, "the region in which the 
defendant is convicted is likely to change the length of time served 
from approximately six months more if one is sentenced in the 
South to twelve months less if one is sentenced in Central Califor­
nia. "151 During the hearings, Congress also discovered that gender 
and race contributed to sentencing disparities. For instance, female 
bank robbers were likely to serve six months less than their simi­
larly situated male counterparts, and African American bank rob­
bers convicted in the South were likely to serve approximately 
thirteen months longer than similarly situated African American 
bank robbers convicted in other regions.152 
The objective of the Guidelines "is to avoid unwarranted sen­
tencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct, while maintaining 
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentencing when war­
ranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account 
in the guidelines."153 As a result, the ability of the criminal justice 
system to treat all defendants equally is enhanced by the 
149. See id. 
150. Id. 
151. Breyer, supra note 113, at 5 (quoting Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice on Sentencing Guidelines of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 676-77 (1987) (testimony of Ilene H. 
Nagel, U.S. Sentencing Commissioner)). 
152. See id. 
153. 52 Fed. Reg. 3920 (1987). 
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Guidelines.154 
To enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to treat all 
defendants equally, Congress sought (1) honesty in sentencing 
through the elimination of the parole system; (2) reasonable uni­
formity in sentencing by eliminating the wide disparity of sentences 
for similarly situated offenders; and (3) proportionality in sentenc­
ing through appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct 
of differing severity.155 Congress also hoped to move toward "a 
process of accountability, greater uniformity, and articulated rea­
sons for punishment. "156 
Recognizing that the proscribed numerical calculations for sen­
tencing mandated by the Guidelines would not encompass all of the 
factors relevant to sentencing, Congress created a small number of 
"departure exceptions" to restore some level of SUbjectivity to sen­
tencing for appropriate cases.157 Specifically, Congress determined 
that one way of satisfying the goal of maintaining flexibility would 
be to allow a sentence reduction if the defendant assisted in the 
prosecution of other criminals.15s 
2. 	 Departure Exception: Section 5K1.1 Substantial 

Assistance 

Departure exceptions permit judges to depart from prescribed 
Guideline ranges in two situations: (1) where the prosecutor moves 
for downward departure on the basis of substantial assistance;159 or 
(2) when there is an aggravating or mitigating circumstance that the 
Commission did not adequately take into consideration in formulat­
ing the Guidelines.16o The court has no power to deviate from the 
154. See Schweickert, supra note 110 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the fairness and equality policies. 
155. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 3922; see also Houser, supra note 130, at 363-65 (examin­
ing the interplay between the goals of the Guidelines and their application). 
156. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, 
Role of the Offender, and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 181, 181 (1988). 
157. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K (1998). Most 
departures in § 5K are provisions that allow a sentencing judge to increase a sentence 
beyond the statutory maximum. See id. Some examples of departures include section 
5K2.1, which allows a judge to increase a sentence if death resulted from the defend­
ant's act; § 5K2.4 which allows for an increase if a hostage was taken or an abduction 
took place; and § 5K2.8 which allows for an increase if the defendant's conduct was 
"unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim." Id. 
158. See id. § 5Kl.1. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. § 5K2.0; see also United States v. Doe, 870 F.Supp. 702, 706 (E.D. Va. 
1994) (finding that the primary purpose of the departures is "to increase the percentage 
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Guidelines unless extraordinary circumstances exist.161 
The Guidelines have significantly restricted the discretion en­
joyed by present day sentencing judges in comparison to the free 
reign judges enjoyed prior to the Guidelines.162 Consequently, the 
court's restricted sentencing power dramatically increases the 
power of the prosecutor.163 Specifically, section 5K1.1 gives the 
prosecutor the power to decide whether a defendant may receive 
potential leniency in recognition of his or her substantial assist­
ance.164 Although assistance from the defendant can result in a 
sentence reduction, a non-sequitur defendant's refusal to assist the 
prosecutor in the investigation of other persons may not be consid­
ered an aggravating sentencing factor.165 
"Federal prosecutors have a particularly wide range of 
[prosecutorial] choices [because] ... [m]ost federal offenses also 
constitute state offenses. "166 Thus, prosecutors have enormous dis­
cretion in the pre-trial phase of litigation. Additionally, even if only 
federal charges are filed, federal statutes permit the prosecutor to 
choose to prosecute the defendant under a variety of different 
charges because of unsystematic and overlapping provisions.167 As 
a result, a defendant who commits one crime involving many vari­
ables (such as a crime involving narcotics, the use of a firearm, and 
of criminals who are successfully prosecuted for their crimes," and not to reward 
criminals for wrongdoing). 
161. See United States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that 
the government's motion is an unequivocal condition precedent to a downward depar­
ture for defendant's cooperation); United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 293-94 (1st 
Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Willis, 956 F.2d 248, 251 (11th Cir. 1992) (same). 
162. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 
SMU L. REv. 469, 485 (1998) ("The Guidelines replaced what was largely unguided 
trial court discretion in imposing criminal sentences with calibrated guidelines that sig­
nificantly restricted trial court discretion."). 
163. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for 
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 926 (1991) (discussing the prosecutor's pow­
ers). The sentencing reform movement has not restricted sentencing discretion so much 
as it has transferred discretion from judges to prosecutors. See id. See infra Part I.B.3 
for further discussion of prosecutorial discretion. 
164. See Lee, supra note 4, at 109 (stating that "[s]ince prosecutors historically 
have been granted broad discretion in charging and bargaining, one might reasonably 
question what harm exists in granting prosecutors a little more discretion in this limited 
area of sentencing"). 
165. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.2 (1998) (stating that re­
fusal to assist the prosecutor can not adversely effect the sentence the defendant ulti­
mately receives). 
166. David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse ofFederal Guideline 
Sentencing, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 881,892 (1996). 
167. See id. at 892-94 (stating that the current discretion possessed by the prose­
cutor causes "chaos" and reduces the overall predictability of sentencing). 
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money in excess of $500) may be subject to ten different federal 
charges, of which the prosecutor may decide which charges, if any, 
the defendant will face at trial. 
In 1994, substantial assistance departures constituted over sev­
enty percent of all departures from the Guidelines.168 The substan­
tial assistance departure exception states that "[u]pon motion of the 
Government stating that the defendant has provided substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who 
has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guide­
lines. "169 The plain meaning of this clause provides that absent a 
motion by the prosecutor, the court and the defendant do not have 
the power to file this motion independently.17o An examination of 
the legislative history also reveals that in 1989, Congress substituted 
the word "provided" for "made a good faith effort to provide."I71 
The purpose of the amendment was to clarify the Commission's in­
tent that these departures were strictly for substantial assistance, 
and not just a defendant's willingness to provide assistance.l72 
Although the intent of Congress may have been to ensure that the 
defendant provides actual assistance, studies have shown that in 
practice the defendant need not provide actual assistance if the 
prosecutor feels that the defendant is "deserving" of leniencyP3 
The substantial assistance departure serves two purposes: (1) 
the provision permits "ex post facto tailoring of defendants' 
sentences to reflect meaningful assistance rendered" by defendants 
and (2) "it provides defendants, ex ante, with an incentive to coop­
erate in the administration of justice."174 
Prosecutors have always had the discretion to decide what 
cases to investigate, when to grant immunity, when to plea bargain, 
168. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REp. 83 (1994). 
169. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1998). 
170. See supra notes 5 & 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts' 
inability to depart from the Guidelines absent a motion from the government. 
171. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 290, at 672 (1998­
99); see also Lee, supra note 4, at 111 n.16. 
172. See Lee, supra note 4, at 111 n.16. 
173. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Em­
pirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guide­
lines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 531 (1992). "Because of the flexibility introduced by 
permitting a 5K1.1 motion for effort regardless of effect, this particular policy can be 
used to reward sympathetic defendants who have not provided truly substantial help." 
Id. "Furthermore, probation officers report that they sometimes learn ... that a de­
fendant benefiting from a section 5K1.1 motion has not really done anything to assist 
the government." Id. 
174. United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1155 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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and what recommendation to make under the Guidelines.175 Prose­
cutors also have the discretion to decide what, when, and where the 
filing of charges will take place.176 The Guidelines, however, have 
had the effect of bestowing the prosecutor with an additional power 
that directly affects the sentencing of the defendant.177 This power 
exists because only the prosecutor has the ability to file a substan­
tial assistance motion, thus allowing the judge to deviate from the 
harsh Guideline sentencing.178 In essence, the prosecutor acts in 
two capacities: as a prosecutor and as asentencing judge. 
Although Congress attempted to limit sentencing discretion by 
creating the Guidelines, it appears that in reality Congress has 
shifted the discretion away from the judiciary into the hands of the 
govemment.179 Thus, prosecutorial discretion plays an important 
role in understanding the use of plea bargains and, ultimately, sub­
stantial assistance motions. 
3. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutorial discretion can be beneficial to both a defendant 
who is attempting to receive a lighter sentence via a substantial 
assistance motion and to the prosecutor who is trying to secure a 
conviction.180 Although the creation of the Guidelines has in­
175. See Fisher, supra note 99, at 749. 
176. See id. 
177. See Lee, supra note 4, at 108 (describing that only the prosecutor has the 
power to decide whether a defendant may receive leniency). 
178. See Hon. Patti Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guide­
lines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1027,1052 
(1997) (stating that "[w]ithout a government motion, a court cannot depart downwards 
below the guidelines range based on a defendant's substantial cooperation under sec­
tion 5K1.1 'despite meanspiritedness or even arbitrariness on the government's part''') 
(quoting Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992)). 
179. See Fisher, supra note 99, at 749. 
180. See Guidorizzi, supra note 36, at 761-62 (stating that justifications for plea 
bargaining include the great benefits provided to both the state and the defendant, as 
well as its potential for encouraging rehabilitation and efficiency). But see Saris, supra 
note 178. After examining the pros and cons of substantial assistance motions, Judge 
Saris stated the following: 
In short, downward departures based on substantial assistance motions are an 
invitation to unwarranted, secret sentencing disparity. There is no judicial re­
view of the government's decision whether to file a substantial assistance mo­
tion, and as a practical matter, a sentencing court has unfettered discretion in 
determining the extent of downward departures. 
With respect to cooperating individuals, there is little assurance that a drug 
trafficker in New Hampshire will receive the same sentence as one in Rhode 
Island, or that even among cooperating defendants who are similarly situated 
and cooperate in similar ways, that the sentences will be uniform.... 
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creased prosecutorial power, this discretion is not completely unfet­
tered.181 For example, the decision to file a downward departure 
motion, as with other methods of enforcing criminal laws, 182 cannot 
be based on racial prejudices. 
While prosecutors do not have unfettered discretion, judges 
will, as rule of thumb, defer to a prosecutor's decisions to initiate 
and conduct criminal prosecutions.183 The basis for this deference 
is that courts acknowledge that the numerous complex decisions 
prosecutors must make are ill-suited for judicial review.184 There­
fore, there is a rebuttable presumption that prosecutors undertake 
prosecutions in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner.18S 
There have been many constitutional challenges to the Guide­
lines, and more specifically to the requirement that the prosecutor 
file a substantial assistance motion prior to a sentence reduction, 
but none of these challenges have been successful.186 The Supreme 
Id. at 1049. 
181. See Fisher, supra note 99, at 748-53 for a discussion of prosecutorial 
discretion. 
182. Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is subject to constitutional 
constraints. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); see also Fisher, supra 
note 99, at 750. There are two basic constitutional attacks: (1) vindictive prosecution 
(which violates a defendant's due process rights) and (2) selective or discriminatory 
prosecution (which denies a defendant equal protection of the laws). See id. For exam­
ple, a prosecutor cannot selectively prosecute based on racial prejudices. See Wayte, 
470 U.S. at 608. Likewise, a prosecutor cannot refuse to file a substantial assistance 
motion based on the defendant's race or religion. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 
181, 185-86 (1992). 
183. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (stating that "so long 
as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense 
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or 
bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion"). 
184. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (stating that "[s]uch factors as the strength of the 
case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priori­
ties, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not 
readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake"); 
Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that "prosecutorial 
discretion has long been recognized as sacrosanct"); see also Fisher, supra note 99, at 
750 (stating that prosecutorial discretion involves various decisions that the judiciary is 
not equipped to review). 
185. See Smith, 375 F.2d at 248; see also Fisher, supra note 99, at 750 & n.36. 
186. See generally United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 280-81 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that a provision requiring that the Government move for downward departure 
due to substantial assistance does not violate substantial due process); United States v. 
Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that requiring cooperation prior 
to filing a motion for downward departure does not violate due process guarantees); 
United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that there is no consti­
tutional right to a substantial assistance motion); United States v. Spees, 911 F.2d 126, 
127 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the requirement that the government file a motion prior 
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Court has also held that when a prosecutor specifically agrees to act 
pursuant to a plea agreement, the prosecutor is bound to the exact 
terms of the agreement.187 Thus, if a written plea agreement does 
not include a sole discretion clause, but rather states that in return 
for a guilty plea the prosecutor will file a substantial assistance mo­
tion upon the defendant's agreement to testify for the government, 
the prosecutor is bound to perform once the defendant provides 
testimony.188 The decision to enter into a plea agreement with a 
promise to file a substantial assistance motion, however, rests com­
pletely with the discretion of the prosecution.189 
The United States Supreme Court has not directly dealt with 
the balance between prosecutorial discretion and a defendant's 
right to have a substantial assistance motion filed.190 However, the 
Court has broadly examined the extent of prosecutorial discretion 
in the context of prosecuting defendants. 
In Wayte v. United States,191 the government instituted a "pas­
sive enforcement" policyl92 in which the government prosecuted 
only persons who reported themselves to the government as having 
failed to register for the draft. The United States Attorney at­
tempted to prosecute this defendant under a passive enforcement 
policy.193 The defendant argued that "passive enforcement" is un­
constitutional on equal protection grounds.194 
to imposition of downward departure does not violate separation of powers or due 
process); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1035-36 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that 
cooperation with the prosecutor does not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
371 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the Guidelines). 
187. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 
188. Cf id. (stating that "circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is that 
when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, 
so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must 
be fulfilled"). 
189. See generally Fisher, supra note 99, at 749. 
190. See generally Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992). Although Wade 
dealt with a substantial assistance motion, there was no written plea agreement between 
the prosecutor and defendant. See id. at 183. 
191. 470 U.S. 598 (1985). In Wayte, the defendant refused to register with the 
Selective Service and wrote letters to several government officials proclaiming his in­
tent to continue to do so. See id. at 601. 
192. See id.; see also United States v. Schmucker, 815 F.2d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(stating that under a passive enforcement policy, the "government selected for prosecu­
tion only those who reported themselves or were reported by others as having violated 
the registration requirement," and all others who remained silent or unreported were 
not sought out for prosecution). 
193. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 603. 
194. See id. at 604 (moving for dismissal on the ground of selective prosecution). 
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The Court held that passive enforcement is permissible in some 
instances, noting that "although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it 
is not unfettered," and thus is ultimately subject to constitutional 
constraints.195 The justices in Wayte disagreed on the appropriate 
standard for evaluating selective prosecution claims.196 Justice 
Powell, writing for the majority, used a standard equal protection 
analysis.197 In order to succeed on such a claim, the defendant must 
show that the policy used had a "discriminatory effect and was mo­
tivated by a discriminatory purpose."198 By contrast, the dissent ar­
gued that in order to establish a prima facie case of selective 
prosecution on equal protection grounds, the defendant must show 
that (1) "he is a member of a recognizable, distinct class;" (2) "a 
disproportionate number of the class was selected for investigation 
and possible prosecution;" and (3) "this selection procedure was 
subject to abuse or was otherwise not neutral. "199 
Ultimately, although the justices disagreed as to the exact test 
to be applied to prosecutorial discretion, the Court recognized that 
prosecutors are given broad discretion regarding who to prosecute, 
and the Court concluded that prosecutorial discretion is not "unfet­
tered."2°O Thus, while the Supreme Court did not specifically dis­
cuss plea agreements in Wayte, the Court made it clear that 
prosecutorial discretion is bound by constitutionallimits.201 How­
ever, two Supreme Court cases have directly discussed different as­
pects of plea agreements in other contexts. 
195. Id. at 608 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979), in 
which the Court held that the decision to prosecute may not be "deliberately based on 
an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification") (inter­
nal quotations omitted). 
196. Arguments against constitutionality were made on First Amendment 
grounds (using the O'Brien test), due process grounds, and equal protection standards. 
See id. at 608-14. 
197. See id. at 608. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 626 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 
494 (1977». 
200. See id. at 608. The Court recognized, however, that prosecutorial discretion 
should be limited in only certain circumstances because: 
Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens 
to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decision­
making to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by 
revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All of these are substantial 
concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision 
whether to prosecute. 
Id. at 607-08. 
201. See id. at 608. 
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4. Supreme Court Decisions Concerning Plea Agreements 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly decided whether a court 
may review a prosecutor's refusal to file a downward departure mo­
tion when the plea agreement grants the government "sole discre­
tion." In fact, the Court has rarely discussed plea agreements and 
prosecutorial discretion.2OO However, two Supreme Court cases, 
Santo bello v. New York203 and Wade v. United States,204 provide dis­
tinct frameworks for considering prosecutorial reviewability and 
the use of contract principles. 
a. Santobello v. New York 
In Santo bello , the Supreme Court held that when a prosecutor 
fails to abide by the specific terms of a plea agreement, the court 
may grant the defendant specific performance of the terms of the 
plea agreement.205 In Santobello, the plea agreement obligated the 
prosecutor to not make any sentencing recommendation to the 
judge in return for Santobello's guilty plea.206 When sentencing fi­
nally occurred, after a series of delays and counsel changes by both 
the prosecutor and the defendant, the new prosecutor recom­
mended the maximum sentence to the sentencing judge.207 The 
202. Although the plea is an integral part of the justice system, the United States 
Supreme Court has rarely discussed the issue in its holdings. See, e.g., United States v. 
Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997); Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995); United States 
v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995); Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994); 
Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 
(1989). 
203. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
204. 504 U.S. 181 (1992). 
205. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63. In Santobello, the defendant was indicted 
in New York on two felony gambling charges. See id. at 258. Petitioner entered a plea 
of not guilty on both counts. See id. After negotiations between the prosecutor and the 
defendant, the prosecutor permitted the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser included 
offense that carried a maximum sentence of one year. See id. According to the lower 
court: 
[Where] the defendant's plea of guilty was entirely voluntary and [was] in­
tended in itself as a complete act and a final disposition of the charges against 
him, with the sentencing function to be exercised as matter of course following 
a performance of the prosecutor's promise .... There was no coercion or over­
reaching on the part of the prosecution ... due process and the interests of 
justice will be fully served by a remand for resentence with the specific per­
formance of the prosecutor's promise. 
People v. Santobello, 39 A.D.2d 654, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972). 
206. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 258. 
207. See id. at 259. The prosecution listed variables such as Santobello's criminal 
record and his alleged links with organized crime to justify the recommendation. See id. 
Over vigorous objections, defense counsel was overruled. See id. 
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judge sentenced the petitioner to the maximum one year sentence 
as recommended.208 
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, asking the 
Court to review the prosecutor's decision to deviate from the spe­
cific terms of the plea agreement. 209 On review, Santobello argued 
that since he had fulfilled his part of the bargain by pleading guilty, 
and the prosecutor failed to fu1fi11 his promise not to make a sen­
tencing recommendation, he should be allowed to withdraw his 
guilty plea.2Io The Supreme Court held that "when a plea rests in 
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, 
so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, 
such promise must be fu1fi11ed. "211 In reaching its decision, the 
Court acknowledged that plea agreements are important in the ad­
ministration of justice both at the state and federal level and serve 
an important role in the disposition of most cases.212 Justice Doug­
las, in concurrence, stated that if the parties enter into a plea agree­
ment, and one party reneges on the agreement, the plea is void 
because courts must promote "an outraged sense of fairness."213 In 
support of this conclusion, Justice Marshall, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, stated that when a prosecutor breaks an agreed 
upon element of the bargain, he undercuts the basis for the waiver 
of the defendant's constitutional rights implicit in the plea.214 
The Supreme Court's use of contract terminology in Santobello 
has led some circuit courts to apply basic contract principles when 
208. See id. at 260. Pending appeal, the defendant sought and obtained bail after 
the judge imposed the maximum sentence of one year. See id. The New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed the petitioner's 
conviction and denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. See id. The 
petitioner then sought and obtained certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. See 
id. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. at 263. 
211. Id. at 262. 
212. See id. at 260-61. "The disposition of criminal charges by agreement be­
tween the prosecutor and the accused ... is an essential component of the administra­
tion of justice." Id. at 260. According to the Court, the number of defendants far 
exceeds judicial capacity. See id. 
213. Justice Douglas stated that the Court should set up a new constitutional rule 
when a plea bargain is not kept by the prosecutor. See id. at 267 (Douglas, J., concur­
ring). When the plea bargain is breached, the sentence should be vacated, and the state 
court must decide whether to order (a) specific performance of the original plea bargain 
or (b) a new trial on the original charges. See id. (Douglas, J., concurring). 
214. Justice Marshall believed that the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement 
was enough evidence to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and have a 
new trial ordered. See id. at 267-69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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reviewing the government's refusal to file a substantial assistance 
motion pursuant to a plea agreement.215 These circuits have held 
that if the prosecutor breached a plea agreement with the defend­
ant, the court is then empowered to grant specific performance or 
permit withdrawal of the defendant's guilty plea.216 In contrast, the 
remaining circuits have held that the holding in Santobello only ap­
plies to plea agreements in which the prosecutor expressly agrees to 
do something, and therefore Santo bello is not applicable to "sole 
discretion" plea agreements in which the prosecutor expressly 
reserves the right to independently consider the value of the assist­
ance given by the defendant.217 These courts hold that only when 
defendants plead guilty in return for government concessions are 
the defendants legally entitled to the agreed upon concession.218 
While Santobello addressed the enforceability of plea agree­
ments that do not contain sole discretion language, the Supreme 
Court did not address the issue of substantial assistance until Wade 
v. United States.219 Specifically, Wade addressed whether, in the ab­
sence of a plea agreement, a defendant may challenge a prosecu­
tor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion.220 
b. Wade v. United States 
In Wade,221 the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor is em­
powered to file a substantial assistance motion,222 and the court 
215. See, e.g., United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Imtiaz, 81 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 691 
(D.C. Cir 1995); United States v. Kahn, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990); see also 
Gyurci, supra note 13, at 1268-70 (discussing the application of contract principles to 
plea bargains). 
216. See, e.g., United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 1992); see also, Gyurci, supra note 13, at 
1269 & n.82 (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring». 
217. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the circuits that have held that there is 
no power to review a prosecutor's decision not to file a 5K1.1 motion. 
218. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1953. 
219. 504 U.S. 181 (1992). 
220. See id. at 183-86. 
221. In Wade, the police arrested the defendant on federal drug charges, to which 
he plead gUilty. See id. at 183. Prior to sentencing, the defendant offered law enforce­
ment officials information that led to the arrest of another dealer. See id. The defend­
ant offered this information without any written plea agreement. See id. The judge 
sentenced the defendant to the Guidelines' ten-year statutory minimum sentence. See 
id. The defendant requested that the court reduce the sentence below the minimum 
standard to reward him for his substantial assistance to the government. See id. The 
court denied the defendant's request. See id. 
222. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for a discussion of substantial 
assistance. 
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may review the prosecutor's refusal to file the motion only in situa­
tions where an unconstitutional motive prompted the prosecutor's 
decision.223 Therefore, the Court held that the prosecutor's discre­
tion to file a substantial assistance motion is subject only to consti­
tutional lirnitations.224 The defendant's dissatisfaction with the 
prosecutor's evaluation of the assistance is insufficient to trigger ju­
dicial review unless accompanied by unconstitutional motives.225 
Moreover, the Court emphasized that Congress gave the govern­
ment the power to file a downward departure motion, and not a 
duty to do SO.226 
Although neither Santo bello nor Wade directly address the is­
sue of whether courts have the power to review a prosecutor's deci­
sion not to file a sole discretion substantial assistance motion, these 
cases provide the necessary background to understanding the cur­
rent split among the circuits. 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: To REVIEW OR NOT TO REVIEW 
The current split in the United States Courts of Appeals con­
cerning the reviewability of a prosecutor's decision to file a sole 
discretion substantial assistance motion has centered on the appli­
cability of Wade or Santobello, as well as other basic contract prin­
ciples.227 The Courts of Appeals have reached different conclusions 
regarding the nature of the plea agreement itself.228 Specifically, 
the courts must decide whether sole discretion substantial assist­
ance plea agreements are tools by which prosecutors may exercise 
complete discretion, or whether plea agreements constitute con­
tracts that courts may review using basic contract principles. The 
223. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-86 ("[W]e see no reason why courts should treat a 
prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion differently from a prosecu­
tor's other decisions ... [and] we hold that federal district courts have authority to 
review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a rem­
edy if they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive."). 
224. See id. at 186. "Thus, a defendant would be entitled to relief if a prosecutor 
refused to file a substantial-assistance motion, say, because of the defendant's race or 
religion." Id. 
225. See id. A mere claim that a defendant provided substantial assistance is not 
enough to trigger a judicial review. See id. Generalized allegations of improper motive 
are also not enough. See id. A defendant has "no right to discovery or an evidentiary 
hearing unless he makes a 'substantial threshold showing'" of prejudicial prosecutorial 
behavior. Id. 
226. See id. at 185. 
227. See Lee, supra note 4, at 168 (discussing the issue of prosecutorial discretion 
in general). 
228. See infra Part II.A and II.B for a discussion of the circuit split. 
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non-reviewing circuits do not apply contract theory when reviewing 
a prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion. 
In contrast, the reviewing circuits perform a contract-based review. 
The decisions of the non-reviewing circuits, comprised of the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits,229 form an 
overwhelming majority when compared to the circuits that allow 
courts to review a prosecutor's decision to not file a substantial 
assistance motion, which include the District of Columbia, Second, 
and Third Circuits.230 
A. 	 Courts Do Not Have the Power to Review a Prosecutor's 
Refusal to File a Sole Discretion Substantial Assistance 
Motion 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits (collectively referred to 
as the "non-reviewing circuits") have held that courts do not have 
jurisdiction to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial 
assistance motion absent unconstitutional motivations.231 The non­
reviewing circuits hold that Wade directly applies to sole discretion 
plea agreement cases even though the defendant in Wade had no 
plea agreement. Therefore, these courts do not review 
prosecutorial discretion other than where decisions are based upon 
unconstitutional grounds.232 As such, these circuits hold that courts 
do not have jurisdiction to review a prosecutor's decision not to file 
a 5K1.1 motion, even if a defendant alleges bad faith or improper 
229. See infra Part II.A for a thorough discussion of the circuits that do not re­
view a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion. 
230. See infra Part n.B for a thorough discussion of the circuits that allow courts 
to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion. 
231. See, e.g., United States v. Moses, No. 97-4321, 97-4193, 1998 WL 67795 (4th 
Cir. Feb. 20, 1998); United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937 (10th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Mote, No. 95­
30372,1996 WL 528437 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1996); United States v. Padilla, No. 95-1282, 
1995 WL 590451 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bagnoli, 7 F.3d 90 (6th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Fairchild, 940 
F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1991). 
232. See Mote, 1996 WL 528437, at *2 (stating that Mote failed to meet the sub­
stantial threshold requirement); Price, 95 F.3d at 367-68 (per curiam) (stating that ac­
cording to Wade, "[a]bsent a motion for downward departure made by the 
Government, a sentencing court is without authority to grant a downward departure on 
the basis of substantial assistance under § SKU") (citing Wade v. United States, 504 
U.S. 181, 184 (1992»; see also United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(stating that absent an agreement, the government alone has the right to decide 
whether or not to file the motion for downward departure). 
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motive.233 For example, the Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant 
is not entitled" 'to a remedy or even to discovery or an evidentiary 
hearing' unless the prosecution relied on an unconstitutional motive 
in refusing to file a 5K1.1 motion."234 
In addition, these courts also hold that a defendant's claim that 
he provided substantial assistance does not entitle a defendant to 
judicial intervention.235 Because the government has the ultimate 
discretion to file the motion, "a defendant's assertion of 'good faith' 
is irrelevant."236 Specifically, "[n]othing a defendant does, up to 
and including a 'good faith' effort to assist the government, guaran­
tees him a substantial assistance departure."237 
The non-reviewing circuits recognize that the prosecution can 
bargain away its discretion by specifically stating what the defend­
ant must do in order for the assistance to be considered substan­
tial.238 In essence, this type of agreement would remove 
233. See Raynor, 939 F.2d at 195 (stating that absent an agreement in which the 
government expressly agrees to file a substantial assistance motion, the defendant has 
no right to question the government's motives when the government fails to file the 
motion) (citing United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169, 172 (4th Cir. 1991), affd, 504 U.S. 
181 (1992». 
234. See United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 46 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing 
Wade, 504 U.S. at 186); accord Price, 95 F.3d at 367-68 ("5KU does not require the 
government to move for a downward departure if the defendant provides substantial 
assistance, but rather grants the government discretionary power to make such a mo­
tion") (quoting Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 46); United States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740, 
743-44 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the court denied the plaintiff's request for a review 
of the prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion since there was no 
allegation of unconstitutionality); United States v. Underwood, 61 F.3d 306, 312 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (stating that the government did not bargain away its discretion, therefore 
the plaintiff's issue was without merit). 
235. See United States v. Sims, No. 95-5116, 1992 WL 190909, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 
11, 1992) (unpublished opinion) (finding that the district court can only inquire into the 
government's decision not to file a section 5K1.1 motion if the defendant can make a 
"substantial showing" that the refusal was unconstitutional) (citing Wade, 504 U.S. at 
186); see also Price, 95 F.3d at 368-69 (stating that a refusal to file a substantial assist­
ance motion is only reviewable for unconstitutional motives). 
236. Fairchild, 940 F.2d at 266. Likewise, the court has rejected the notion that 
the court can order departure under 5K1.1 if the prosecutor failed to make the motion 
in "bad faith." See United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir. 1992). 
237. Fairchild, 940 F.2d at 266. See generally Burrell, 963 F.2d at 985. In Burrell, 
the defendant challenged the plea agreement's sole discretion clause because he felt 
that he had divulged "substantial" information by helping the government obtain a 
guilty plea against his accomplice. See id. at 984. Because the defendant never argued 
that the denial was based on unconstitutional grounds, the court determined that it had 
no power to review the prosecutor's decision not to file the motion, regardless of the 
extent of the actual assistance. See id. at 985. According to the court, there is no review 
for arbitrariness or bad faith. See id. 
238. See United States v. Dixon, 998 F.2d 228,230 (4th Cir. 1993) ('''[W]hen a 
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prosecutorial discretion and objectify the relationship between the 
prosecutor and the defendant. Once a prosecutor does this, and the 
defendant offers the specified objective "substantial assistance," the 
prosecutor must file the 5K1.1 motion regardless of the prosecutor's 
overall dissatisfaction with the defendant's assistance.239 Thus, the 
non-reviewing circuits have recognized that when a defendant ne­
gotiates a plea agreement that includes the government's agree­
ment to file a motion for downward departure under section 5K1.1, 
the defendant obtains the right to require the government to fulfill 
its promise.240 However, absent an agreement to do so, the govern­
ment has the right to decide, in its sole discretion, whether to file a 
motion for downward departure based upon the government's sub­
jective impression of the defendant's substantial assistance.241 
Specifically, a violation of the terms of a plea agreement is a 
"question of law that is reviewed de novo" and the defendant has 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
underlying facts establish a breach of the plea agreement.242 In de-
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise ... such promise must be fulfilled."') 
(quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971»; cf United States v. Cour­
tois, 131 F.3d 937 (10th Cir. 1997). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has 
stated that the specific language of the agreement is the determinative factor as to 
whether the government has bargained away their discretion. See id. at 937. Where the 
prosecutor reserves sole discretion to decide whether or not to file a substantial assist­
ance motion, the language of the agreement does not obligate the government to file a 
§ 5KU motion. See id. at 939. Therefore, "[e]ven if the defendant undeniably renders 
substantial assistance, the government retains discretion to decide whether to request a 
§ 5K1.1 downward departure." Id. at 938. 
239. See Courtois, 131 F.3d at 938-39. 
240. See United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that 
"when a defendant is able to negotiate a plea agreement that includes the government's 
agreement to file a motion for downward departure ... the defendant obtains rights to 
require the government to fulfill its promise") (citing United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 
169,173 (4th Cir. 1991»; see also Courtois, 131 F.3d at 938-39 (same); Price, 95 F.3d at 
368 (same); United States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740, 743 (5th Cir. 1996) (same). 
241. See Courtois, 131 F.3d at 938 (stating that the government always retains 
discretion to determine whether to file a 5K1.1 motion). The non-reviewing courts 
seem to imply that a defendant who enters into a sole discretion substantial assistance 
plea agreement does so at the risk of prosecutorial dissatisfaction and with no judicial 
remedy. See Raynor, 939 F.2d at 195. 
242. See Price, 95 F.3d at 367; United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 46 (5th 
Cir. 1993). In Garcia-Bonilla, the plea agreement provided: 
The United States reserves its option to seek any departure from the applica­
ble sentencing guidelines, pursuant to Section 5K of the Sentencing Guidelines 
and Policy Statements, or Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules Criminal Procedure 
[sic], if in its discretion, it is determined that such a departure is appropriate. 
The defendant agrees that the decision whether to file such a motion rests 
within the sole discretion of the United States. 
Id. 
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termining whether the government has violated a plea agreement, 
the court must first determine whether "the government's conduct 
is consistent with the parties' reasonable understanding of the 
agreement."243 Thus, where both parties understood that the pros­
ecutor would use its sole discretion to determine whether or not to 
file a substantial assistance motion, the defendant may not question 
the government's decision not to file.244 In such a situation, the 
"defendant is not entitled to a hearing" under Wade unless the re­
fusal to file the 5Kl.l motion was based on an unconstitutional 
motive.245 
Second, the court must examine the specific language of the 
plea agreement, because the question of whether or not the prose­
cutor retained his or her discretion to file a substantial assistance 
motion turns upon the specific language in the agreement. The 
non-reviewing circuits have held that the prosecutor has only bar­
gained away his or her discretion if the plea agreement expressly 
states that the prosecutor has done SO.246 Moreover, the prosecutor 
retains the sole discretion to determine if he or she will file a sub­
stantial assistance motion, notwithstanding the fact that an agree­
ment does not include an objective definition of sole discretion.247 
Taking a slightly different approach, the Ninth Circuit has ac­
knowledged that plea agreements are contractual in nature,248 and 
243. See Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 46 (quoting United States v. Valencia, 985 
F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1993»; see also United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 
n.7 	(9th Cir. 1993). In De la Fuente, the court stated: 
[A]s a practical matter, because we employ objective standards-it is the par­
ties' or defendant's reasonable beliefs that control-the difference between 
stating that the defendant's or the parties' beliefs control is minimal. The con­
struction we adopt, however, incorporates the general rule that ambiguities 
are construed in favor of the defendant. 
Id. 
244. See Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 47. 
245. See United States v. Bagnoli, 7 F.3d 90, 92 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing Wade's 
holding that a court only has the authority "to review the Government's failure to move 
for a downward departure ... if the court finds that the refusal was based on an uncon­
stitutional motive"). 
246. See Price, 95 F.3d at 369 (finding that "the government may bargain away its 
discretion under the terms of a plea agreement, and thereby obligate itself to move for a 
downward departure in exchange for the defendant's substantial assistance"); United 
States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1996); Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 46-47. 
247. See United States v. Wallace, 22 F.3d 84, 87 (4th Cir. 1999). If the prosecutor 
reserves the sole discretion to decide whether or not to file a motion, the court cannot 
review the prosecutor's decision not to do so absent some evidence of unconstitutional 
motives. See id. Therefore, implicit in the term sole discretion is unreviewability. 
248. See United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that 
"[p]lea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law stan­
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has held that the court may consider what the defendant reasonably 
understood when he entered into the plea agreement.249 However, 
the court has yet to make such a holding in the context of a substan­
tial assistance plea agreement. Notwithstanding the defendant's ex­
pectations, the courts have ultimately held that the government's 
sole discretion usually prevails.250 Some circuits, choosing not to 
follow the non-reviewing circuits, have held that fairness requires 
that prosecutorial discretion be reviewed by the court in certain 
circumstances.251 
B. 	 Courts Do Have the Power to Review a Prosecutor's Refusal 
to File a Substantial Assistance Motion 
The dissent in United States v. Forney,252 which strongly pro­
tested the majority opinion shared by the circuit courts that disal­
low review of prosecutorial discretion, best sums up the reasoning 
behind allowing reviewability: 
The majority holds that regardless of the extent of [the defend­
ant's] cooperation, the government is obligated to do absolutely 
nothing. This result is inconsistent with Supreme Court prece­
dents governing plea agreements, with principles of contract law, 
and with fundamental fairness. The government promised to 
consider filing a 5Kl.l motion; it must be required to act in good 
faith in fulfilling this promise. As with any other promise in a 
plea agreement, the district court must ensure that this promise is 
fulfilled.253 
dards," yet are not reviewable under contract law theory); see also United States v. 
Mote, No. 95-30372, 1996 WL 528437, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1996) (unpublished deci­
sion); United States v. Floyd, 1 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1993). 
249. See United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993) ("In 
construing an agreement, the court must determine what the defendant reasonably un­
derstood to be the terms of the agreement when he pleaded guilty.") (citing United 
States v. Anderson, 970 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by, 990 F.2d 1163 (9th 
Cir. 1993)). 
250. See Mote, 1996 WL 528437, at *1. The plea agreement included the follow­
ing language: "the government alone will determine [if] it will apply for any additional 
offense level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or FED. R. Cry. P. 35 in return for your 
client's full and truthful cooperation." Id. "The (prosecutor] did not breach the plea 
agreement because the parties stipulated ... that the decision to file a motion for a 
substantial assistance departure was solely within the government's discretion." Id. 
Because the agreement was clear and unambiguous, no breach occurred. See id.; see 
also United States v. Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 928-29 (9th Cir. 1996). 
251. See infra Part H.B for a thorough discussion of the circuits that allow courts 
to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion. 
252. 	 9 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1993). 
253. 	 Id. at 1504 (Clarke, J., dissenting). 
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According to the dissent, a district court judge is not only author­
ized to examine the prosecutor's discretion based on contract prin­
ciples, but is obligated to do so in order to ensure fairness.254 
Following this basic premise, a number of circuits have concluded 
that plea agreements include the same elements as contracts,255 and 
therefore, a prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance 
motion is reviewable using the basic contract principle of good 
faith.256 
For example, the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia has held that a district court may examine a plea 
agreement to ensure that the defendant and the prosecutor have 
fulfilled all previously agreed upon contingent obligations.257 In ad­
dition, even where a plea agreement does not guarantee that the 
government will file a 5Kl.l motion, all plea agreements include an 
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, as well as an obli­
gation that the government make an honest and informed 
decision.258 
Reviewing circuits have also criticized plea bargaining agree­
ments that contain sole discretion clauses as a whole.259 For exam­
ple, the District of Columbia Circuit criticized plea agreements as 
granting United States Attorneys "extraordinary power" since only 
the government can act by filing a 5Kl.l motion prior to any type of 
254. See id. (Clarke, J., dissenting). 
255. See infra note 304 and accompanying text for the definition of a contract. 
256. See, e.g., United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Profeta, No. 91-3224, 
1993 WL 185730, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 1993) (unpublished opinion); United States v. 
Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1486 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Kahn, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 
(2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir. 1990). 
257. See United States v. Sparks, 20 F.3d 476, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that 
"[t]he only government obligation is a contingent one: 'if the Departure Guideline 
Committee ... determines that [the defendant] has provided substantial assistance ..., 
then this Office will file a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.c. § 3553(e), and 5K1.1.' If the 
contingency is not fulfilled, the departure motion is not filed. Period."); see also Jones, 
58 F.3d at 689. In Jones, the United States Attorney indicted a United States postal 
employee on one count of theft of mail and one count of forgery. See id. at 689-90. The 
appellant entered into a plea agreement that gave the prosecution the discretion to file 
a 5K1.1 motion upon a finding that the defendant substantially assisted in the prosecu­
tion of another. See id. at 690. When the government did not file a section 5K1.1, the 
appellant moved the court to compel the government to file the motion. See id. The 
district court ultimately held that the language of the agreement "created only a contin­
gent obligation," and thus, the government had no obligation to file the motion. Id. at 
691. 
258. See Jones, 58 F.3d at 692. 
259. See id. at 691 ("Although we are satisfied that the Government fulfilled its 
obligations under the plea agreement, [certain] aspects of the case trouble us."). 
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sentencing departure.26o This power could result in the prosecutor 
using the 5Kl.l motion as an improper tool of persuasion: 
"[P]rosecutors might dangle the suggestion of a section 5Kl.l mo­
tion in front of defendants to lure them into plea agreements, all 
the while knowing that defendant's cooperation could not possibly 
constitute assistance valuable enough [to be considered] 
'substantial.' "261 
The Second Circuit has recognized that where there is a coop­
eration agreement that provides for a downward departure motion, 
and that agreement incorporates substantial assistance language, 
the discretion of the prosecutor is generally the sole determinant 
when evaluating the quantity of useful information.262 However, 
the court further recognized that although "criminal sentencing 
proceedings are not the same as civil contract disputes,"263 courts 
may nonetheless interpret plea agreements with principles bor­
rowed from the law of contracts.264 Accordingly, as in contracts, 
there is an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in every 
plea agreement.265 "Consequently, the prosecution's determination 
that it is dissatisfied with the defendant's performance under the 
cooperation agreement-as with other areas of prosecutorial dis­
cretion-may not be reached dishonestly or in bad faith."266 
260. See id. The court recognized that the defendant's only chance of obtaining a 
sentence outside of the Guideline grid was through prosecutorial discretion. 
261. Id. at 691-92; cf United States v. Fairchild, 940 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(stating that the court was concerned that the government had failed to objectively 
define substantial assistance within the plea agreement). 
262. See United States v. Kahn, 920 F.2d 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that 
"[w]ith such broad discretionary power, prosecutors would have little incentive to mis­
use cooperation agreements and renege on their promises to move for downward de­
partures") (citing United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1989». 
263. Id. at 1105 (citing Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1988». 
264. See id. (citing United States v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Carbone, 739 F.2d 45, 46 (2d. Cir. 1984». 
265. See id. (stating that "[i]n every contract there is an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing which precludes each party from engaging in conduct that will 
deprive the other party of the benefits of their agreement") (citing Filner v. Shapiro, 
633 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added». "Good faith is defined in Uniform 
Commercial Code § 1-201(19) as 'honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con­
cerned.'" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONfRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979) (citation omit­
ted). "Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to 
an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other 
party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' 
because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." Id. 
266. Kahn, 920 F.2d at 1105 (finding that the prosecutor could not substitute a 
more serious charge at the new trial after defendant's successful appeal) (citing 
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974»; United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 
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The reviewing circuits have further stated that although the 
prosecutor reserves sole discretion, the sole discretion does not 
grant the court the power to disregard the Supreme Court's holding 
in Santobello v. New York. 267 For example, in United States v. Cer­
tuche ,268 responding to the defendant's motion to compel the gov­
ernment to file a 5K1.1 motion, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that courts must adhere to all agreements" 'unless the 
government's proffered explanation for withholding the section 
5Kl.l motion is "wholly insufficient" or unless the defendant's ver­
sion of events, supported by at least some evidence, contradicts the 
government's ... .' "269 
While the reviewing circuits have acknowledged that 
prosecutorial discretion is essential in the judicial system, they have 
concluded that it does not outweigh the importance of fairness to a 
defendant.270 For example, in United States v. Knights,271 the court 
stated that "[b]ecause the prosecution often is in the best position 
to evaluate the quality of a defendant's cooperation and to decide 
whether to make a substantial assistance motion, this decision, like 
other prosecutorial determinations, may be subjected to ... limited 
review."272 Thus, the Knights decision permits judicial review to 
ensure fairness to the defendant, although the review is somewhat 
limited. 
When a cooperation agreement allows for a substantial assist­
ance motion contingent on the government's subjective evaluation 
1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that an allegation of intentional and purposeful discrimina­
tion leading to selective prosecution required further investigation). 
267. 404 U.S. 257 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1486 (2d Cir. 1992); Kahn, 920 F.2d 
at 1105. 
268. No. 97-1327, 1998 WL 537778, at *2 (2d Cir. July 29, 1998) (unpublished 
decision). In Certuche, one of the defendants (Aguirre) entered into a section 5K1.1 
sole discretion plea agreement after being charged with several narcotic violations. See 
id. The defendant then moved to compel a 5K1.1 filing after the government refused to 
do so. See id. 
269. Id. (quoting United States v. Imitaz, 81 F.3d 262, 264 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
270. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 483 (stating that the defendant gives up his right to a 
"fair trial" when he signs a plea agreement and therefore should be afforded a "good 
faith" assistance evaluation by the prosecutor). 
271. 968 F.2d 1483 (2d Cir. 1992). In Knights, the defendant pled guilty to drug 
offenses pursuant to a plea agreement. See id. at 1485. The plea agreement provided 
that the government would move for a substantial assistance motion if, in the govern­
ment's sole and unfettered discretion, the defendant had met the government's expecta­
tions. See id. 
272. Id. at 1487 (citing United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d at 710, 713 (2d Cir. 
1990)). 
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of a defendant's efforts to cooperate, the district court may review 
whether the prosecution based its decision on unconstitutional con­
siderations, such as religion, race, or "'whether the prosecutor has 
made its determination in good faith."'273 Most of the reviewing 
circuits have stated that Wade is not authoritative because it is inap­
plicable to sole discretion plea agreement cases. This is due to the 
fact that the Wade Court did not deal with a written plea agree­
ment. The reviewing circuits agree that plea agreements are a sim­
ple matter of contract law, once the court determines that there is a 
contractual relationship between the defendant and the govern­
ment.274 If the plea agreement contemplates a motion, a contrac­
tual relationship exists and the district court is free to apply 
contract principles to determine whether the provisions of the 
agreement are met.275 
"When a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, 
he gives up his rights to a fair trial, confrontation, and a potential 
acquittal by a jury; the government, in return, secures its conviction 
without effort or risk."276 Thus, reviewing courts have stated that 
defendants reasonably expect the government to act in good faith, 
and therefore any claim to the contrary allows some level of exami­
nation by the district court.277 
Those judges dissenting from the courts' ability to review 
273. Id. (quoting Rexach, 896 F.2d at 714). 
274. See United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that 
'''[p]lea agreements are unique contracts in which special due process concerns for fair­
ness and the adequacy of procedural safeguards [apply]"') (citation omitted); see also 
United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that courts may apply gen­
eral fairness principles to invalidate particular terms of a plea agreement). In United 
States v. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 1998), the court noted that: 
[T]he government frequently will agree as part of a plea agreement to consider 
whether to offer a § 5K1.1 motion. In such a case, even if the government 
reserves "sole discretion" to determine whether to offer a motion, a district 
court has authority to depart downward for substantial assistance when the 
government's refusal to offer a motion is "attributable to bad faith." This ex­
ception derives from contract law .... [Contract law principles] apply because, 
without them, the defendant would be deprived of the benefit of his plea bar­
gain and his plea would be involuntary. 
Id. (citing Isaac, 141 F.3d at 483-84; Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971». 
275. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 482 ("We treat[] the issue of compliance with the plea 
agreement as a straight-forward matter of contract law ...."). 
276. Id. at 483. 
277. "When the agreement contains a [sole discretion] § 5Kl.1 provision ... it is 
not the case that the clause regarding government discretion deprives the defendant of 
any reasonable expectation of receiving something in return for the surrender of his 
rights." Id. Defendants do not strike illusory bargains with the prosecutor simply be­
cause the prosecutor retained sole discretion. See id. 
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prosecutorial discretion have argued against review for fear of an 
overall breakdown in prosecutorial discretion and efficiency.278 
Understanding that prosecutorial discretion is necessary to success­
fully prosecute criminals, a fear of judicial review may hamper their 
ability to successfully prosecute. Notwithstanding the dissenters' 
opinions, and the holdings of the non-reviewing circuits, the bene­
fits of applying contract theory to sole discretion substantial assist­
ance plea agreements outweigh the drawbacks. 
278. In Isaac, the defendant entered into a plea agreement in which the govern­
ment agreed to file a section 5K1.1 motion if "in its sole discretion," the government 
determined that the defendant had fulfilled his obligation of cooperation. See id. at 
479. The court found that sole discretion did not give the prosecutor unfettered discre­
tion, and thus his decision not to file the substantial assistance motion was reviewable 
by the judiciary. See id. at 481-84. The dissent agreed with the majority that Santo bello 
v. New York provides the analytical framework for evaluating the terms of a plea agree­
ment. See id. at 485 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). However, the dissent disagreed with 
the majority's decision to find that Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992), was 
inapplicable. See id. at 486-87 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). The dissent decided that 
extensive judicial supervision of prosecutorial discretion will prove detrimental to the 
criminal justice system and will have a chilling effect on prosecutorial effectiveness. See 
id. at 488 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (discussing Wade and Wayte v. United States, 470 
U.S. 598 (1985), generally). The dissent reasoned that congressional intent conferred 
prosecutorial discretion upon the government for the purpose of recommending a de­
parture from the Sentencing Guidelines due to a defendant's substantial assistance. See 
id. at 489 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). Further, a prosecutor's refusal to file a section 
5K1.1 motion should be evaluated like all other prosecutorial decisions, and therefore, 
should only be subject to judicial review if the defendant can make a substantial show­
ing of an unconstitutional motive. See id. at 486 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). The fact 
that Wade did not involve a plea agreement was irrelevant because the underlying hold­
ing of the Supreme Court was that review of plea bargaining discretion is only permissi­
ble for unconstitutional motives, and not merely for an accusation that the defendant 
substantially assisted in their own opinion. See id. at 487 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
When a defendant and prosecutor enter into a sole discretion plea agreement, the par­
ties' expectations are that the defendant is in effect bargaining away the right of anyone 
else to examine the government's discretion. See id. at 486 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) 
(stating that" 'once the government uses its § 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in 
the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the agree­
ment''') (quoting United States v. Connor, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th Cir. 1991». Thus, 
even under the standards set forth in Santobello, the district court is not permitted to 
review a plea agreement if that plea agreement specifically bargained away the discre­
tion of the court and the right of the defendant to question the reasoning of the govern­
ment. See id. at 487-89 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). Rather, a plea agreement can only 
be examined if the government has expressly agreed to do something, and then failed to 
perform on that promise. See id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting). See supra Part II.A for a 
thorough discussion of other circuits that do not allow judicial review of a prosecutor's 
refusal to file a substantial assistance motion. 
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF 

APPLYING CONTRACT PRINCIPLES TO SOLE DISCRETION 

SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE MOTIONS 

This analysis examines three issues related to viewing plea bar­
gains as contracts. First, this section examines the applicability of 
Wade to written plea agreements, including an examination of judi­
cial reviewability of prosecutorial discretion.279 Second, this section 
examines sole discretion and the applicability of contract principles, 
including a discussion of the applicability of Santobello and four 
contract defenses which may apply to the enforceability of a plea 
agreement.280 These defenses include invalidation arguments such 
as failure to bargain in good faith, duress, unconscionability, and 
the creation of an illusory promise.281 Finally, this section proposes 
an alternative resolution to the current circuit split that may ap­
pease the courts on both sides and benefit both prosecutors and 
defendants.282 
A. Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Agreements 
Prosecutorial discretion and plea agreements play an integral 
part in the administration of justice.283 Wade v. United States284 rec­
ognized this importance and refused to allow judicial intervention 
into prosecutorial discretion, absent specific unconstitutional mo­
tives.285 The non-reviewing courts have embraced this reasoning 
and held that Wade applies even when the prosecutor and defend­
ant have formed a plea agreement. 
1. The Applicability of Wade to Written Plea Agreements 
As previously discussed, the Wade Court held that when a 
prosecutor fails to file a substantial assistance motion, the prosecu­
tor's discretion is reviewable only if motivated by unconstitutional 
prejudices.286 For example, if the prosecutor decided not to file a 
279. See infra Part lILA. 
280. See infra Part III.B. 
281. See infra Parts III.B.4.a-d. 
282. See infra Part IILe. 
283. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971). 
284. 504 U.S. 181 (1992). 
285. See id. at 185-86. 
286. See id. Wade pled guilty to a crime without the protection of a plea agree­
ment, but nonetheless spontaneously offered the prosecutor information, presumably in 
the hopes that his sentence would be reduced. See id. The prosecutor readily accepted 
the information and used it to his benefit, but offered no substantial assistance motion. 
See id. 
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substantial assistance motion due to the defendant's race, sex, or 
religious affiliation, a court could independently review the assist­
ance provided by the defendant.287 According to Wade, before a 
court will allow discovery or an evidentiary hearing about a defend­
ant's accusation of unconstitutional prosecutorial motivation, a de­
fendant must make a "substantial threshold" showing that the 
government's refusal to file the substantial assistance motion was 
based on an unconstitutional motive or was "not rationally related 
to any legitimate [government] end."288 In Wade, the defendant 
never entered into a plea agreement with the prosecutor, but rather 
volunteered all information.289 Therefore, in writing for a unani­
mous Court, Justice Souter did not address the judicial reviewability 
of a prosecutor's failure to file a substantial assistance motion in the 
context of a written plea agreement.290 If the facts had been differ­
ent, however, the Court may have decided to extend its analysis and 
examine the issue of prosecutorial discretion and sole discretion 
substantial assistance motions. 
The major argument against applying Wade in cases involving 
sole discretion clauses is that Wade did not involve a written plea 
agreement.291 Courts that refuse to apply Wade 292 note that the de­
fendant in Wade bargained away nothing,293 and therefore Wade is 
distinguishable from those cases involving a written sole discretion 
substantial assistance agreement. Thus, the reviewing courts argue 
that since Wade is factually distinguishable from the written plea 
agreement situation, the court is not limited by the restrictive lan­
guage used in Wade, and is free to examine the agreement based on 
'2J37. See id. 
288. Id. at 186. 
289. See id. at 183. 
290. Therefore, the Supreme Court left the lower courts to ponder the Wade im­
plications on their own. See Fisher, supra note 99, at 762 (stating that "Justice Souter's 
failure to resolve the apparent ambiguities in § 5K1.1, his failure to address plea agree­
ments, and his failure to reconcile the disagreement in the circuits demonstrate his un­
willingness to make [Wade] significant"). Many courts have held that Wade is 
distinguishable from sole discretion plea agreements and therefore not applicable. See 
supra Part II.B for a thorough discussion of the circuits that allow courts to review a 
prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion. 
291. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that "[a] 
close reading of Wade indicates that its teachings are confined to situations in which 
there is no plea agreement"). 
292. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the reviewing circuits and their refusal 
to apply Wade. 
293. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 483 ("[T]he difference between the situation now 
before us and that in Wade is that the defendant here has bargained away important 
rights."). 
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contract theory.294 
While it may appear obvious to the reviewing circuits that 
Wade is distinguishable from cases involving sole discretion sub­
stantial assistance plea agreements, a cost-benefit analysis demon­
strates that both situations are quite similar. Therefore, it may not 
be possible to completely discard Wade, as the reviewing courts at­
tempt to do. 
A cost-benefit analysis simply examines the effects of external 
factors (cost) on future decision-making (benefit). The cost-benefit 
analysis of Wade reveals the following costs and benefits. In Wade, 
the risk of being imprisoned was very high. In an attempt to reduce 
his sentence, the defendant offered (without a plea agreement) all 
the crime-related information he possessed.295 Despite the fact 
that the government found the information very helpful, the gov­
ernment never agreed to file a substantial assistance motion.296 
This same cost-benefit equation fits the sole discretion substan­
tial assistance situation as well. Regardless of the presence of a 
written plea agreement, the risk of lengthy imprisonment is still 
very high because the Guidelines require imposing a predetermined 
sentence. In addition, while the defendant attempts to reduce the 
high risk of imprisonment by revealing all criminal information, the 
sole discretion agreement guarantees nothing in return since the de­
cision to award the substantial assistance motion rests entirely with 
the prosecutor.297 
Hence, both situations end with a high risk of imprisonment 
and a low guarantee of a reduced sentence, no matter how "sub­
stantially" the defendant assists the government. In either the 
Wade or the sole discretion plea agreement situation, the govern­
ment has the right not to file a downward departure motion. More­
over, in either circumstance, the government is under no obligation 
to use objective factors in its decision of whether or not to file the 
motion. Consequently, the court cannot easily review the prosecu­
tor's decision. 
Therefore, despite the factual distinction between the two situ­
ations, the cost-benefit analysis reveals that the difference may be 
insignificant. If the difference is in fact insignificant, it would ap­
pear that Wade must also apply to the sole discretion substantial 
294. See id. at 481 n.l. 
295. See generally Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992). 
296. See id. at 183. 
297. See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of prosecutorial discretion. 
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assistance cases. Thus, a prosecutor's decision in a sole discretion 
substantial assistance case should be reviewable only upon uncon­
stitutional grounds. 
Although this is a logical reason for applying Wade to sole dis­
cretion substantial assistance cases, other considerations should also 
be taken into account. To ensure fairness and justice, courts may 
have a stronger interest in reviewing cases in which the defendant 
actually contracted for a specified term. Wade offered information 
uncoerced and without any exchange.298 Conversely, defendants 
who do not volunteer information freely, but rather bargain away 
the information for an increased chance of freedom, should be al­
lowed to attack the agreement and require specific performance in 
the form of a 5K1.1 motion.299 Although it is not possible to re­
quire specific performance of a clause that is not obligatory, it is 
possible to require the parties to act in good faith, and any actions 
to the contrary would permit the court to force the prosecutor to 
file the motion. Both defendants in the cost-benefit analyses gave 
valuable consideration in the form of a bargain in exchange for a 
potentially shorter sentence. While the cost-benefit analysis of sub­
stantial assistance plea agreements may be essentially identical to 
Wade, in order to uphold the integrity of the justice system, courts 
should discard Wade in sole discretion substantial assistance cases 
and allow good faith and other contract principles to become part 
of the enforceability determination.3°O 
Allowing a court to review the prosecutor's decision not to file 
a substantial assistance motion would be a further check on 
prosecutorial discretion. After all, the sentencing judge is the one 
who determines the defendant's exact sentence.301 This examina­
tion would also further ensure the integrity of the judicial system by 
allowing an objective outside party to view the various factors the 
prosecutor considered when making the decision whether or not to 
file a 5K1.1 motion. 
298. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 183. 
299. See generally Isaac, 141 F.3d at 481; see also United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 
331,334-35 (2d Cir. 1996). In Pollack, the court stated that "where the explicit terms of 
a cooperation agreement leave the acceptance of the defendant's performance to the 
judgment of the prosecutor, the prosecutor may reject the defendant's performance 
provided he or she is honestly dissatisfied." Id. at 335 (quoting United States v. Rex­
ach, 896 F.2d 710, 713 (2d Cir. 1990)). "The government's dissatisfaction, however, 
cannot be premised on bad faith, invidiousness, or dishonesty." Id. 
300. See infra Part III.B for a more detailed discussion of the policy issues behind 
allowing the application of contract principles to substantial assistance motions. 
301. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text. 
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The non-reviewing circuits hold that "sole discretion" bestows 
an absolute power upon the prosecutor: the sole discretion agree­
ment "plainly reserves the government's [own] discretion to receive 
information from the defendant and then exercise its discretion on 
whether to file for a downward departure."302 Consequently, these 
circuits seem to imply that the simple presence of "sole discretion" 
language forecloses any possibility that the agreement is a contract, 
and thus reviewable.303 This implication ignores the fact that plea 
agreements, notwithstanding the "sole discretion" language, con­
tain all the basic elements of a contract. 
A contract is "[a]n agreement between two or more persons 
which creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. "304 
At common law, contract formation merely required (a) offer and 
acceptance and (b) consideration.30s Plea agreements satisfy both 
elements, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement arises in the 
criminal context. Regardless of the circumstances in which a con­
tract arises, its existence remains undisputed provided that all of the 
essential elements are present. The defendant has an obligation to 
provide substantial information and the government has an obliga­
tion to fairly evaluate the information in determining whether the 
information is "substantial." A plea agreement contains a bar­
gained-for exchange, consideration, and mutual assent, which 
culminates in a formal, written, and signed document which con­
tains all the essential elements of a contract. 
A legal agreement, whether it be a civil or a criminal plea 
agreement, must be reviewable under basic contract principles.306 It 
appears that the only reason the non-reviewing courts refuse to ap­
ply contract law to the plea agreement is the presence of sole dis­
302. United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1993). 
303. See, e.g., United States v. Walton, No. 97-3138, 1998 WL 544310, at *4 (10th 
Cir. Aug. 26, 1998) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937, 938­
39 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1996). 
304. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (6th ed. 1990); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) ("A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach 
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way 
recognizes as a duty."). 
305. See Richard L. Savage, Laying the Ghost ofReliance to Rest in Section 2-313 
of the Uniform Commercial Code: An "Endpoints" Analysis, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 
1065, 1084 (1993) (citing EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN 
CONTRACT LAW 252-53 (4th ed. 1991)). 
306. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d Cir. 1998). In Isaac, the 
court stated that" 'although a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it remains 
contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under contract-law principles.''' Id. (quot­
ing United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
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cretion language. However, the sole discretion language is not 
separate from the agreement itself, but rather it is just another com­
ponent of the contract. Indeed, the "sole discretion" language is 
only one of many clauses that make up the entire plea agreement 
contract.307 It is illogical that the presence of the words "sole dis­
cretion" would automatically invalidate the classification of a plea 
agreement as a contract. Any other classification contradicts basic 
legal principles. 
Although the non-reviewing circuits do not apply contract 
principles when examining a prosecutor's decision not to file a sole 
discretion downward departure motion,308 one of the non-reviewing 
circuits may be reconsidering its position.309 In contrast to those 
courts that have explicitly refused to apply contract principles to 
"sole discretion" plea agreements based on Wade v. United 
States ,310 the Seventh Circuit gave serious consideration to review­
ing the agreements. For example, in United States v. Burrell,311 
although the court ultimately held that sole discretion plea agree­
ments are not worthy of contract theory invalidation, the court 
closely examined the contract arguments.312 The court considered 
that "[a] guilty plea induced by an unkept bargain is involuntary 
[and therefore] the court must allow the defendant to withdraw the 
plea and to start all over."313 Thus, the Seventh Circuit may be 
willing to reconsider the issue and allow rescission of a plea agree­
ment if the right facts present themselves, such as in a case in which 
the prosecutor's decision resulted in blatant injustice. Should the 
Seventh Circuit ever decide to review plea agreements, the basis of 
such a decision would probably rest on the potential coercion of the 
agreement, as opposed to contract formation.314 
United States v. Fairchild,315 presented another example of the 
Seventh Circuit's hesitation to deny reviewability of plea agree­
ments. The court expressed concern over the prosecutor's absolute 
307. See Hughes, supra note 36, at 2-3 & n.4; see also United States v. Price, 95 
F.3d 364, 366-67 (5th Cir. 1996) (demonstrating a sole discretion clause); Adamson v. 
Ricketts, 789 F.2d 722, 737 (9th Cir. 1986) (demonstrating a multi-clause plea agree­
ment), rev'd, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). 
308. See supra Part II.A for a more detailed examination of the circuits that do 
not review prosecutorial discretion. 
309. See generally United States v. Fairchild, 940 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1991). 
310. 504 U.S. 181 (1992). 
311. 963 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1992). 
312. See id. at 985. 
313. Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 1992». 
314. See id. 
315. 940 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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discretion.316 The court stated that "[n]othing in the plea agree­
ment ... gives away the government's discretion" to decide whether 
or not to make the motion, thus, there is no reason to review the 
government's decision not to file a downward departure motion.317 
However, the court stated that the government should clearly de­
fine "substantial assistance" in objective terms.318 The court stated 
that "the government [should not] take advantage of a defendant's 
ignorance of the [ caselaw on] substantial assistance so as to mislead 
him into believing" that the government will file a downward de­
parture motion if the defendant acts in good faith.319 Although the 
Seventh Circuit ultimately refused to classify the agreement as a 
contract, it appears that the court may be heading in that 
direction.320 
More objectivity in the plea bargain agreement would serve a 
dual purpose. It would be useful (1) for the defendant to know 
exactly what is expected of him prior to signing the agreement; and 
(2) as a method for courts to ensure that the agreement is fulfilled. 
For instance, if the agreement defined substantial assistance as "in­
formation that directly leads to the prosecution of another," and 
the defendant did in fact procure such information, the court could 
easily question the government's motives if the government failed 
to file a 5K1.1 motion. The drawback to this "objective definition" 
solution is that the defendant's incentive to reveal information be­
yond what is required by the agreement disappears. This approach 
would also put tremendous pressure on the prosecutor to gauge 
how much information the defendant actually knows at the outset 
of plea negotiations-a nearly impossible task. 
2. Judicial Reviewability of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutors and defendants rarely appeal sentence departures 
316. See id. at 266. 
317. Id. 
318. See id. An objective substantial assistance agreement might, for example, 
include a definition of substantial assistance. This definition would vary from defendant 
to defendant because each case would be unique. Such a definition might read as fol­
lows: "Substantial assistance, for purposes of this agreement, requires that you, the de­
fendant, will provide information that directly leads to the prosecution of one of your 
suppliers. We, the government, must receive this substantial assistance prior to filing a 
§ 5K1.1 motion." While this solution would not forbid a sole discretion clause, it would 
make the test more objective and promote fairness. The defendant would at least 
know, prior to the signing of the agreement, that he must assist in some specified man­
ner before the government will consider filing a downward departure motion. 
319. See id. 
320. See id. 
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for two reasons. First, the government must file a motion prior to 
the court granting a substantial assistance departure.321 This re­
quirement implies that the government has agreed to a sentence 
departure, and therefore, the government is unlikely to appeal. 
Second, defendants are unlikely to appeal because downward de­
partures are generally to their benefit. 322 Even when a party does 
appeal, appellate courts routinely refuse to hear objections because 
upon receipt of the government's substantial assistance motion, the 
court has unfettered discretion whether to grant or deny the mo­
tion.323 Due to the court's unwillingness to review sentencing de­
partures, "prosecutors 'are free to be lenient or harsh ... without 
public[ ] explan[ ation]''' or defense of their decisions.324 This result 
has led many to believe that courts have unknowingly undermined 
the underlying goals of uniformity and fairness of the Guidelines 
because prosecutors are allowed to act with virtually no judicial 
intervention.325 
There is little opportunity to check the constitutionality of 
prosecutorial decisions because of the "private nature" of 
prosecutorial decision making.326 When the prosecutor makes a de­
cision, there is no public proceeding where the prosecution must 
present its legal theories in support of its decisions.327 Whatever 
321. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1998) (stating that 
"[u]pon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial 
assistance" the court may depart from the guidelines) (emphasis added). 
322. See Lee, infra note 327, at 206. 
323. See United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1485 (11th Cir. 1990); see also 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1998) (stating that upon meeting the 
filing requirements of 5K1.1, "the court may depart from the guidelines") (emphasis 
added). 
324. Gyurci, supra note 13, at 1272-73 (quoting Testimony of the President of the 
Federal Judges Association, Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., 6 FED. SENT. REP. 72, 72 
(1993)). 
325. See id. 
326. See Lee, supra note 4, at 168. Prosecutors are under no obligation to docu­
ment any analysis done in the contemplation and resolution of an issue. See id. at 168­
69. Therefore, all cognitive decisions risk being interwoven with bias, prejudice, and 
bad faith since no mechanism exists to observe a prosecutor's decision-making thought 
process, although, courts will review prosecutorial decisions if there is evidence that 
such a decision was based on an impermissible ground, such as race or religion. See id. 
at 169 n.272. 
327. See Cynthia K. Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Fed­
eral Prosecutor's Expanding Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS 
L. REv. 199,237-39 (1997) (stating that there is little opportunity to check prosecutorial 
decisions, unlike in the judicial arena, where every decision is carefully recorded and 
subject to intense review). 
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the decision may be, it is almost always unreviewable.328 
In contrast to prosecutorial decisions, judges must state their 
reasons for imposing a particular sentence in open court.329 More­
over, any decision by the judge to depart from the Guideline's 
range is subject to appellate review.330 All judicial decisions "must 
be grounded on articulated facts and legal theories stated on the 
open record."331 This system ensures a fair and just decision by the 
judiciary. The judiciary could require prosecutors to be bound by 
the same candor and documentation system in order to review 
prosecutorial discretion in the context of substantial assistance or 
sole discretion plea agreements. 
If a court concludes that plea agreements are contracts, it could 
also easily apply basic contract principles332 to ensure fairness and 
justice. This would let defendants know prior to entering into the 
agreement that although the government expects them to provide 
substantial assistance, the government must measure their satisfac­
tion in good faith.333 Further, defendants would know that a claim 
that the government acted in bad faith, supported by some defined 
minimal evidence, would give them a chance to have the court ex­
amine the prosecutor's discretion.334 
B. Sole Discretion Plea Agreements and Contract Principles 
Santobello v. New York335 stands for the proposition that when 
a prosecutor specifically agrees to act pursuant to a signed plea 
agreement, the prosecutor is bound to that agreement.336 If con­
tract principles are applied to plea agreements, the application may 
indeed have the effect of limiting prosecutorial discretion and in­
creasing court intervention. Regardless of potential drawbacks, jus­
tice and fairness would be better served if courts were to view sole 
discretion plea agreements as contracts. 
328. See id. 
329. See id. at 238. 
330. Id. 
331. See id. (citing United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637-38 (E.D. Wash. 
1990), vacated in part, affd in part, 952 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1991». 
332. See generally supra Part II.B for a discussion of the courts that have applied 
contract principles to plea agreements. 
333. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1998). 
334. See id. at 482-83. 
335. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
336. See id. at 262. 
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1. Should Courts Apply Santo bello and Contract Principles? 
"Plea bargains are, as the name suggests, bargains . . . . "337 
Therefore it seems only natural that courts should regulate and 
evaluate plea agreements as any other bargaining agreement.338 
A typical criminal plea bargain may take place in a courthouse 
hallway between the attorney for the defendant and the prosecutor, 
lasting only minutes.339 The simplicity of the transaction may be 
surprising to outside observers since the outcome of this quick "bar­
gain" will affect years of a defendant's life.340 While apparently a 
simple transaction, this type of bargain involves several complex 
contractual elements.341 In addition, these "bargains" serve a great 
purpose in the judicial system: they promote judicial efficiency by 
eliminating the need for a criminal trial.342 
In contrast to the simple hallway plea, complex plea agree­
ments are common when defendants are facing serious or multiple 
criminal accusations. These more complex bargains may involve 
cooperation agreements and multiple contested issues that involve 
months of negotiation before the parties reach a resolution.343 
These complex plea negotiations culminate in extremely complex 
and long written agreements.344 
The reviewing circuits correctly apply contract principles when 
examining a prosecutor's decision not to file a sole discretion down­
337. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1910 (emphasis in original). 
338. See id. 
339. See id. at 1911-12. The authors state that: 
[M]ost cases are disposed of by means that seem scandalously casual: a quick 
conversation in a prosecutor's office or a courthouse hallway between attor­
neys familiar with only the basics of the case, with no witnesses present, lead­
ing to a proposed resolution that is then "sold" to both the defendant and the 
judge. To a large extent, this kind of horse trading determines who goes to jail 
and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to 
the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system. 
Id. 
340. See United States v. Atkinson, 15 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing an 
example of a bargain in which the defendant's sentence was reduced from 405 months 
to 300). 
341. See supra notes 304-305 and accompanying text for a discussion of the con­
tractual elements present in a plea bargain. 
342. See Saris, supra note 178, at 1052 (stating that nearly ninety percent of all 
cases are resolved through a plea agreement rather than a jury conviction). 
343. See Hughes, supra note 36, at 2-3. 
344. See id. at 2-3 & n.4; see also Adamson v. Richetts, 789 F.2d 722, 737 (9th Cir. 
1986) (en banc) (stating that the defendant's signature was on page five of the plea 
agreement), rev'd 483 U.S. 1 (1987). 
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ward departure motion.345 Generally, the reviewing circuits have 
stated that although Wade v. United States346 "outlined a narrow 
space for a defendant to challenge the government's refusal to file a 
5Kl.l motion in the absence of a plea agreement," i.e., refusal to 
file the motion based on unconstitutional motivations, it did not in­
struct the courts on how to deal with written plea agreements.347 
Rather than applying Wade to the issue of judicial reviewabil­
ity of prosecutorial discretion, the reviewing circuits generally apply 
Santo bello v. New York,348 which applied contract principles to plea 
agreements.349 "[O]nce the government makes an agreement with 
a defendant to file a [section 5Kl.l] motion, it is bound by the 
terms of the agreement. It is a simple matter of contract law."35o 
Applying contract principles to a prosecutor's refusal to file a sub­
stantial assistance motion under 5Kl.l requires the existence of a 
contractual relationship between the defendant and the govern­
ment. Because Wade is inapplicable, the court may examine the 
prosecutor's discretion for reasons beyond those of unconstitutional 
motives.351 The reviewing circuits correctly recognize that sole dis­
cretion plea agreements contain all the essential elements of a con­
tract, and therefore basic contract principles must apply.352 
Applying contract principles to plea agreements would also 
promote judicial economy. It is more useful to have a uniform 
"bright-line" rule that classifies all plea agreements as contracts, as 
opposed to having all the circuits examining each individual plea 
agreement to determine whether it possesses all the necessary con­
tractual elements. Thus, "'where the agreement is conditioned on 
satisfaction of the obligor, the condition is not met "if the obligor is 
honestly, even though unreasonably, dissatisfied.'" "353 According 
345. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the circuit cases that hold that courts 
may review prosecutorial discretion. 
346. 504 U.S. 181 (1992). 
347. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that 
Wade's holding is limited to situations where no plea agreement was ever made). 
348. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
349. See id. at 262-63 (stating that plea agreements are specifically enforceable (a 
contract remedy) against the government if the government breached the agreement). 
See supra Part I.B.4.a for a discussion of Santobello. 
350. United States v. Carrara, 49 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 1995). 
351. See generally United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stat­
ing that any review of a plea agreement includes an investigation into "good faith"). 
352. See id. at 691 ("[A] plea agreement is a contract."); see also Isaac, 141 F.3d 
at 481-84 (reviewing the plea agreement between the defendant and the government). 
353. Isaac, 141 F.3d at 482 (quoting United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713 
(2d Cir. 1990) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979))). 
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to the court, there is an implied obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing in every contract.354 
Moreover, the usefulness of presuming a plea agreement to be 
a contract is beneficial, not only to the court itself, but also to the 
defendant. If the defendant is made aware of the contractual status 
prior to the signing of the plea agreement, the defendant will be 
able to make a more informed choice in deciding whether to plead 
guilty and give up his or her constitutional rights associated with a 
trial. Applying contract principles to plea agreements allows pre­
dictability, consistency, and fairness.355 By concluding that plea 
agreements are contracts, courts afford the defendant the protec­
tions associated with the judicial determination of the enforceability 
of the contract. 
2. Enforceability of the Plea Agreement 
"The bargain theory of contract has dominated American juris­
prudence for well over a hundred years. Its remarkable durability 
rests on a single idea: contracting parties can (and do) reach mutu­
ally beneficial agreements that fully exploit the potential returns 
from their joint enterprise."356 While bargain theory is a sound 
concept, when courts apply bargain theory to sole discretion plea 
agreements, trouble arises.357 
"[C]lassic contract theory supports a presumption favoring the 
354. See id. 
355. See Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty 
Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REv. 567, 583 
(1999). The author stated: 
Plea agreements are contracts of adhesion. Although courts analyze them ac­
cording to ordinary contract principles, they supplement those principles 'with 
a concern that the bargaining process not violate the defendant's right to fun­
damental fairness under the Due Process Clause.' That means courts will hold 
the government to a high level of responsibility in dealing fairly and honestly 
with defendants during plea bargaining. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
356. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1935. 
357. See Recent Case, Plea Agreements-Ninth Circuit Allows Post-Plea Agree­
ment Collateral Attack Based on Change in Underlying Law-United States v. Sando­
val-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REv. 603, 608 (1997). According 
to the author: 
The court's selective use of contract doctrine suggests that it did not fully stand 
behind its assertion that plea agreements are contracts. Although the Sando­
val-Lopez panel suggested otherwise, the Ninth Circuit has not fully applied 
contract principles to plea agreements .... [A]lthough courts must use con­
tract principles to review plea agreements based on breach claims, they cannot 
consider some contract defenses, such as the mistake of fact doctrine. 
Id. 
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enforcement of plea bargains. "358 However, if courts examine sole 
discretion plea agreements under contract theory, many of the 
agreements would become invalid and result in excess litigation, 
thus frustrating one purpose of the Guidelines: judicial economy.359 
Specifically, defendants might consistently raise contract defense 
arguments and force judicial intervention. Thus, instead of parties 
arguing about the guilt or innocence of a defendant, or the impor­
tant factors in the case, the court battIe would center on the en­
forceability of the plea agreement under contract law. 
Critics disagree as to whether courts should invalidate plea 
agreements under the contract principles of lack of good faith, du­
ress, illusory promise, and unconscionability.360 While it may seem 
extraordinary "to look to contract theory to find reasons for prohib­
iting contracts that allocate criminal punishment, ... contract law 
routinely embraces arguments for limiting itself."361 In other 
words, contract law embraces various methods by which it can po­
lice itself. For example, if the defenses to enforceability fail, con­
tract enforcement will prevail. Although the reviewing courts have 
explicitly recognized only a duty to act in good faith, one could ar­
gue that the doctrines of illusory promise, unconscionability, and 
duress are also defenses that could force invalidation of sole discre­
tion plea agreements. 
a. Duty to bargain and act in good faith 
The common law of contracts requires that contracting parties 
engage in certain activities and behave in a certain manner in order 
to successfully create a legally binding agreement. 
[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party 
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injur­
ing the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the con­
tract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied 
358. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1918. 
359. See supra Part I.A.4 for a discussion of the need to economize judicial 
resources. 
360. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 
CAL. L. REv. 652 (1981) (arguing that all plea bargaining is inherently unfair); cf Ste­
phen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1037, 1040-45 
(1984) (stating that there will always be plea bargaining due to limited judicial resources 
and a sense of "doing justice"). 
361. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1918 (arguing that contract law has several 
theoretical tools to invalidate contracts, such as unconscionability, duress, vagueness, 
lack of mutual assent, and lack of consideration. Therefore, contract law, when prop­
erly applied, can police itself). 
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing.362 
The phrase "good faith" exists in a variety of contexts, and its 
meaning varies somewhat with each context. "Good faith perform­
ance ... of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed [upon] 
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of 
the other party."363 In essence, good faith condemns types of con­
duct characterized as "'bad faith' because they violate community 
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. "364 Although a 
complete catalogue of what constitutes bad faith is not possible, the 
following activities have been recognized as demonstrating bad 
faith: "evasion of the spirit of the bargain ... willful rendering of 
imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and in­
terference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's perform­
ance."365 A prosecutor engaged in any of these activities clearly 
frustrates the defendant's chance of receiving a just result. 
For example, when party A to a contract gives party B discre­
tion in the performance of some aspect of the contract, the parties 
ordinarily assume that B will only exercise that discretion for a pur­
pose reasonably contemplated by the parties.366 If B exercises his 
discretion for purposes not contemplated by the parties, B has per­
formed in bad faith.367 
In the case of a plea agreement, assuming that the agreement is 
a contract, as long as there is some evidence to support the claim 
that the prosecutor acted in bad faith, the defendant may ask the 
court to review the agreement regardless of the fact that the prose­
cutor reserved discretion to file the motion.368 However, the de­
fendant would still have to prove that the prosecution acted in bad 
faith, notwithstanding any discretionary language contained in the 
agreement.369 The defendant must show that his performance sub­
362. Uproar Co. v. National Broad. Co., 81 F.2d 373, 377 (1st Cir. 1936). 
363. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979) (discussing 
the definition of good faith as utilized in varying contexts). See supra note 265 for the 
definition of good faith. 
364. RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONTRACTS) § 205 cmt. a (1979). 
365. See id. § 205 cmt. d. 
366. See Stephen J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to 
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 369 (1980). 
367. See id. 
368. See United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979)). 
369. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 14, at 504 (stating that "[t]he dissatis­
faction must be actual and not merely simulated. Under the good faith test, it is diffi­
cult for the plaintiff to prevail"). 
207 2000] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
jectively satisfied the prosecutor, and the prosecutor has other mo­
tives for testifying as to his dissatisfaction.370 Therefore, if the 
defendant wanted to have the prosecutor's refusal to file the sub­
stantial assistance motion reviewed for lack of good faith, the de­
fendant would have to establish the prosecutor's "true state of mind 
by evidence showing that [the prosecutor] made statements giving 
other reasons for his rejection of the performance. "371 
Although seemingly a burden on prosecutors and the integrity 
of the judicial system in general, the drastic consequences of the 
prosecutor's decision outweigh these potential burdens. If the re­
sult of analyzing plea agreements under contract principles causes 
prosecutors to be held liable for their administrative decisions, then 
prosecutors will be forced to carefully analyze the benefit they actu­
ally received from the defendant. This consequence can only bene­
fit the legal system by balancing the relative positions of the parties. 
According to some authorities, evidence of the unreasonable­
ness of the prosecutor's expressed satisfaction is admissible to jus­
tify an inference of bad faith.372 For example, if the court finds that 
the prosecutor acted unreasonably due to the overall extent of the 
defendant's assistance, the judge may infer the prosecutor acted in 
bad faith and had unreasonable expectations. 
In addition to bad faith, another defense to contract enforce­
ment is duress: a claim that one party exerted intense pressure over 
the other. This factor is a variable a court should examine when 
determining overall enforceability of plea agreements. 
b. Duress 
One of the potential arguments for prohibiting plea bargaining 
is that duress373 impermissibly infects such bargains. Under ordi­
nary contract theory, a party will prevail on a duress defense if he 
370. See id. 
371. Id. (stating that although the courts prefer to examine satisfaction based on 
reasonableness, "[i]f the agreement leaves no doubt that it is only honest satisfaction 
that is meant and no more [for example, sole discretion], it will be so interpreted, and 
the condition does not occur if the obligor is honestly, even though unreasonably, dis­
satisfied") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1979}). 
372. See ARlHUR LINTON CORBIN, 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 645 (1965). 
The plaintiff should prevail if he can prove that the promisor is dissatisfied with his 
bargain rather than with the performance. See id. 
373. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 504 (6th ed. 199O) (defining duress as a de­
fense which "[s]ubject[s] [a] person to improper pressure which overcomes his will and 
coerces him to comply with demand[s] to which he would not yield if acting as [a] free 
agent"). 
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can prove that he would not have entered into the contract but for 
the other party's "improperly coercive behavior."374 Applying this 
principle to plea bargaining situations, supporters argue that the 
large difference in sentencing ranges between the Guidelines' 
mandatory sentence and the post-downward departure sentence 
"creates a coercive environment in which the criminal defendant 
has no real alternative but to plead guilty" and hope for a substan­
tial assistance motion.375 Thus, critics of the system assert that 
pleas produced under this type of pressure are never voluntary.376 
Consequently, the duress inherent in the bargain should invalidate 
the contract, or at least permit judicial review of the prosecutor's 
expectations. Absent the threat of losing one's freedom for an ex­
tended period, it is highly unlikely that anyone would enter into a 
sole discretion plea agreement since it provides no degree of re­
viewability. It is an illogical bargain that a defendant would not 
seriously consider, but for his precarious situation. 
When examining the individual situation, duress is blatantly 
apparent. For example, if a defendant faces a congressionally pre­
determined sentence in excess of 300 months, and the evidence 
against the defendant is fairly strong, the only hope the defendant 
may have of escaping a severe sentence is to attempt to plea bar­
gain with the prosecutor. In such a situation, the defendant is at the 
complete mercy of the prosecutor. Any proposed terms that the 
prosecutor dislikes will force the defendant into court. In addition, 
the prosecutor has the ultimate power to file the plea agreement 
with the court, and in substantial assistance cases, the power to de­
cide the adequacy of the defendant's performance. This positioning 
allows the prosecutor to exercise the full strength of his discretion­
ary power. Assuming the defendant wishes to avoid trial and signs 
a plea agreement containing a sole discretion clause, the defendant 
loses all of his constitutional rights associated with trial, in exchange 
for no guarantee of a reduced sentence. 
Consider the following example: assume X wants to purchase 
Y's car, and Y makes the following proposal: "X, I will consider 
selling you my car for the fair market value. First, give me the fair 
market value of the automobile. Then explain to me in detail why 
this is the right car for you. I will later contemplate if I truly feel 
this is the right car for you based on your argument, and if, at my 
374. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1919. 
375. See id. at 1920. 
376. See id. 
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'sole discretion,' I make this determination in the affirmative, I will 
turn the vehicle over to you. On the other hand, if I determine in 
my 'sole discretion' that this vehicle is not the right vehicle for you, 
I will keep the vehicle and fair market value you gave me." Clearly, 
X should not accept Y's offer because this is not a fair exchange. 
As with the case of a prosecutor's sole discretion plea agreement, 
Y's sole discretion offers little hope of fairness to X. 
In both the sole discretion plea bargain situation, and the car 
sale example, there is no method to objectively evaluate either the 
prosecutor's or Y's discretion. This leaves both the defendant and 
X in a completely inferior position. Both the defendant and X have 
provided valuable consideration, and yet their subsequent actions 
do not guarantee any return for them. X would never accept such 
an offer because the consideration paid is too high for the risk of no 
return. In the substantial assistance plea agreement situation, 
although the defendant gives up more valuable consideration than 
X (constitutional rights), he must accept an equally high risk of no 
return (the prosecutor's arbitrary sole discretion standard). Sadly, 
the defendant takes the risk that X never would: he signs the plea 
agreement. 
One reason for the criminal defendant's illogical decision may 
be duress. The defendant would argue that the government's dis­
cretion is purely subjective, with no objective factors to assist in the 
evaluation of the defendant's substantial assistance. Moreover, be­
cause the sole discretion language shields the prosecutor, the prose­
cutor can refuse to file the 5Kl.l motion for any arbitrary reason. 
Thus, the defendant would argue that but for the possibility of a 
severe criminal sentence, such a choice would not be voluntary. 
c. Unconscionability 
In addition to the duress defense, the doctrine of unconsciona­
bility377 provides an alternative argument for invalidation of plea 
agreements. Typically, a plea bargain involves a simple promissory 
exchange: the defendant exchanges his promise to plead guilty for 
the prosecutor's promise to recommend a reduced sentence or file a 
substantial assistance motion.378 In a sole discretion substantial 
assistance agreement, the defendant obtains the prosecutor's prom­
377. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1524 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "unconscio­
nability" as "[a] doctrine under which courts may deny enforcement of unfair or op­
pressive contracts because of procedural abuses arising out of the contract formation, or 
because of substantive abuses relating to terms of the contract"). 
378. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1921. 
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ise to consider filing a downward departure motion upon receipt of 
"substantial" assistance. In this situation, a defendant who agrees 
to a sole discretion clause that is buried in a long and complex plea 
agreement may attempt to raise the defense of unconscionability.379 
The doctrine of unconscionability serves as a kind of "back­
stop," or "a means of granting relief where defects in the bargaining 
process ... do not rise to the level of actual fraud or duress."38o A 
claim of procedural unconscionability is more similar to a claim of 
fraudulent concealment.381 "'Ordinarily, one who signs an agree­
ment without full knowledge of its terms might be held to assume 
the risk that he entered into a one-sided bargain."'382 But when a 
party possesses little bargaining power and no real choice but to 
sign, "with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that 
his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was 
ever given to all the terms. "383 
Defendants, as laypeople, may not understand basic contract 
principles. Even if the defendant retains an attorney and reads the 
terms of the plea agreement, he may not understand the implica­
tions of signing the plea agreement. If the parties do not fully dis­
cuss the agreement, and the defendant does not completely 
understand an important clause (such as the sole discretion substan­
tial assistance clause) prior to the signing of the agreement, the gov­
ernment should bear the burden of proving that the defendant 
understood the agreement. Without such proof, the government 
should bear the risk of having the agreement nullified for proce­
dural unconscionablity.384 
Associated with the claim of procedural unconscionability is a 
claim for substantive unconscionability.385 A substantive uncon­
scionability claim is actionable if there are "substantive abuses re­
lating to [the] terms of the contract, such as terms which violate 
379. See id. at 1922. 
380. Id. at 1921. 
381. The basic test of unconscionability is whether, under circumstances existing 
at the time of the contract and in light of general commercial standards, a clause is so 
one sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise the one party. See Division of the Triple T 
Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969). 
382. PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACITONS 3-15 (1989) 
(citation omitted). 
383. Id. 
384. See id. (stating that a "court may use the procedural unconscionability doc­
trine to ... abrogate the agreement altogether"). 
385. See infra note 386 and accompanying text for a definition of substantive 
unconscionability. 
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reasonable expectations of [the] parties or which involve gross dis­
parities ...."386 "'[A] contract is largely an allocation of risks be­
tween the parties, and therefore . . . a contractual term is 
substantively suspect if it reallocates the risks of the bargain in an 
objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.' "387 When an 
agreement requires that a defendant give valuable consideration at 
the outset of the plea bargain, and the prosecutor has the option of 
giving nothing in return, the prosecutor has unreasonably reallo­
cated the risk of loss on the defendant. This unbalanced bargain 
involves substantive abuses amounting to a gross disparity.388 This 
same argument could also lead to the conclusion that the plea bar­
gain is an illusory promise.389 
386. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1524 (6th ed. 1990). 
387. ALCES, supra note 382, at 3-19 (quoting A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 
186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)). 
388. The defendant may also argue that the theory of gross disparity requires 
invalidation of the entire plea agreement. In cases involving sole discretion plea agree­
. ments, the defendant forfeits all rights associated with a trial and in return receives a 
mere gesture that the government will subjectively consider a sentence reduction. See 
United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1998). Although freedom of contract 
is extremely broad, it is far from absolute. See Smith v. Bush, 312 F.2d 131, 133-34 (5th 
Cir. 1963) (stating that the government has the right to limit a person's ability to con­
tract based on public policy, health, and safety reasons). While it is possible to waive 
constitutional rights by contract, there are limits, such as people cannot enter enforcea­
ble contracts to enslave themselves. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the 
Law of Contract, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 775-77 (1983). In plea bargaining, the defendant 
literally trades the "risk of 'enslavement' (prison) ... for a certainty of somewhat less 
enslavement." Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1929 (emphasis in original). Although 
applying contract theory to plea agreements may permit the defendant to have a pleth­
ora of defensive enforcement tools to combat unfair prosecutorial discretion, the 
Supreme Court's decision in Wade may severely limit the extent to which contract prin­
ciples apply. 
389. See Daniel Frome Kaplan, Comment, Where Promises End: Prosecutorial 
Adherence to Sentence Recommendation Commitments in Plea Bargains, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 751 (1985). The author stated: 
[I]n a commercial contract setting, for example, a court will construe as illu­
sory, and hold unenforceable, any promise to perform that is conditioned on 
the promisor's discretion. Where, however, the illusory promise is made by 
the government in the context of plea negotiations, the prosecutor has been 
held to be bound to the subsequent agreement and to his promise. 
Id. at 757. 
Some civil cases disallowed "sole discretion" language due to its illusory essence. 
See Davis v. General Foods Corp., 21 F. Supp. 445, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (stating that 
a promise to compensate based solely on the promisor's discretion is illusory and can­
not support a binding contract). Likewise, in some pre-guideline criminal cases, the 
court has held that sole discretion language used by the prosecutor in a plea agreement 
is illusory. See People v. Tobler, 397 N.Y.S.2d 325, 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (stating 
that the plea bargain was unenforceable because "[t]here are considerations paramount 
to the power of individuals to contract. . .. [B]ecause of the significance of plea bar­
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d. Illusory promise 
A promise lacks consideration if the purported promisor 
reserves the possibility of choosing alternative performances and at 
least one of which does not constitute consideration.390 For exam­
ple, X offers to sell some commodity to Y at $10.00 per unit, with 
the quantity entirely left to Y's discretion. If Y accepts X's offer, 
the contract will be ruled unenforceable because Y did not provide 
valid consideration.391 Y could choose to purchase nothing. 
The offer proposed by the prosecutor seems analogous to the 
above illusory contract example. In sole discretion plea agree­
ments, the prosecutor is merely agreeing to consider the filing of a 
substantial assistance motion, whereas the defendant is actually giv­
ing valuable information to the prosecutor. The information given 
by the defendant is valid consideration because it is an inducement 
to the prosecutor to enter into a contract. In contrast, the prosecu­
tor is offering potential or future consideration (a reduced sentence 
for the defendant). Therefore, prior to the prosecutor filing the 
5K1.1 motion, the contract is illusory, and thus invalid. 
To date, no defendant has raised the illusory promise concept 
to invalidate a plea agreement that contains a substantial assistance 
clause. However, in In re Adirondack Railway Corp. ,392 a bank­
ruptcy court held that if a contract is based on a condition that may 
gaining, it is important that the conduct of the Court and the District Attorney meet 
standards of basic fairness"). Looking at the wide-spread use of sole discretion plea 
agreements, it is obvious that this line of reasoning has not been accepted by the federal 
courts. See supra Parts II.A-B for examples of courts that permit sole discretion 
language. 
390. An illusory contract exists when parties reach an agreement, but one or both 
parties fail to put forth actual valid consideration. An illusory promise is defined as: 
A promise or apparent promise is not consideration if by its terms the prom­
isor or purported promisor reserves a choice of alternative performances un­
less (a) each of the alternative performances would have been consideration if 
it alone had been bargained for; or (b) one of the alternative performances 
would have been consideration and there is or appears to the parties to be a 
substantial possibility that before the promisor exercises his choice events may 
eliminate the alternatives which would not have been consideration. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 (1979). These types of promises have 
also "traditionally been considered insufficient to support promissory estoppel liability 
because they are not true promises." Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promis­
sory Estoppel and Reliance on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 841, 857 (1990) (emphasis 
in original). 
391. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1979). 
392. 95 B.R. 867, 874 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). In Adirondack, a railroad corporation 
contracted with the state of New York to restore a rail line, but the corporation later 
went bankrupt. See id. at 868. The debtor eventually sued the state for payment for the 
work it had performed. See id. After reaching a tentative settlement, the court rejected 
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or may not arise, then the agreement is "a promise in form, but not 
in substance."393 The court stated that statements of intention 
which make performance entirely optional do not rise to the level 
of enforceability.394 
Although the facts of the Adirondack contract case are obvi­
ously distinguishable from sole discretion plea agreement cases, the 
court's contract analysis is applicable. Using this analysis, it ap­
pears that prosecutors who use sole discretion plea agreements are 
attempting to get something for nothing. Unfortunately for the 
prosecutor, contract law does not permit enforcement of such an 
agreement. 
Although contract principles give the defendant additional 
protections and increase predictability and consistency throughout 
the judicial system, applying contract principles could also poten­
tially frustrate some of the purposes behind the Guidelines. One 
purpose behind the creation of the Guidelines was to ensure consis­
tent and fair sentences.395 Applying contract principles to plea 
agreements would seem to enhance fairness and consistency. How­
ever, another purpose of the Guidelines was to improve judicial 
economy and allow sentencing that is relatively efficient and fast.396 
If contract principles are applied to plea agreements, this purpose 
might be frustrated. 
3. 	 Potential Negative Implications of Applying Contract 
Principles to Plea Agreements 
Although plea agreements contain all the necessary elements 
of a contract, applying contract principles to plea agreements and 
permitting judicial review presents problems. One drawback to ap­
plying contract principles to a plea agreement is the fact that chal­
lenges to the prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial 
assistance motion will expend precious judicial time and resources. 
Because the unsatisfied defendant will use the court to resolve his 
dissatisfaction with the prosecutor's decision, the defendant will de­
feat the central purpose of plea bargaining-conserving energy and 
resources. If all criminal prosecutions proceeded to trial, the judi­
its acceptance because payment by the state was subject to liens that could arise later. 
See id. at 874. This condition made the contract illusory. See id. 
393. Id. 
394. See id. 
395. See supra Part LB.1 for a discussion of the purposes behind the Sentencing 
Guidelines. 
396. See supra Part LB.l. 
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cial system would be gridlocked beyond repair.397 Allowing plea 
agreement contract arguments to fill the courts' dockets may cause 
the courts to be just as gridlocked as they would be if all defendants 
went to trial. 
Another drawback of permitting review of plea agreements 
under contract principles is the effect that such review may have on 
the integrity of the Guidelines. Because of the possibility of over­
crowded court dockets, if courts evaluate plea agreements using 
contract principles, Congress would probably need to modify the 
Guidelines to disallow the use of sole discretion language in plea 
agreements. Only the removal of this tool from the prosecutor's 
arsenal would curb the potential major influx of additional litiga­
tion. Meanwhile, the use of sole discretion language would become 
a less powerful prosecutorial weapon. The threat of gridlock may 
also curb prosecutorial aggressiveness. It is possible that fewer 
criminals would be prosecuted for lack of resources. With fewer 
resources available, a type of selective prosecution may take place, 
in which only the most dangerous criminals are prosecuted. Even 
when criminals are prosecuted, the prosecutor may be hesitant to 
enter into a plea agreement because of judicial oversight and addi­
tional litigation the agreement may cause. 
Notwithstanding these possibilities, it would be improper for a 
court to deny a defendant justice solely on this basis. Rather, con­
tract theory applicability should be evaluated on the substantive el­
ements of the agreement itself and not based on fear of increased or 
prolonged litigation. Assuming increased litigation does occur, and 
Congress decides not to disturb the sole discretion language in the 
Guidelines, justice would require the government to allocate more 
money to the judicial system to accommodate the influx. 
To avoid both the possibility of increased litigation over plea 
agreements and the necessity of eliminating the sole discretion lan­
guage of the Guidelines, Congress could modify 5K1.1 as I have 
proposed in the following section. Modification would allow an un­
satisfied defendant to withdraw his guilty plea if the prosecutor re­
fused to file a substantial assistance motion. This alternative to the 
current section 5K1.1 would have three benefits: (1) it would allow 
the prosecutor to continue to derive the benefits of the sole discre­
397. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBERG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 59 (1994); see also 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (stating that a "[d]isposition of 
charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but ... highly 
desirable [because] [i]t leads to [a] prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal 
cases"). 
215 2000] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
tion clause; (2) it would acknowledge that plea agreements are con­
tracts; and (3) it would allow the defendant to retain his or her right 
to a trial without judicial intervention in the agreement.398 
Although contract disputes can be very complex and time con­
suming to resolve, especially when intertwined with a criminal pros­
ecution, the eventual outcome and protection afforded to all sides 
far exceeds the ensuing complexity of issues that the judiciary must 
resolve. 
C. A Possible Solution: The Best of Both Worlds? 
Because the majority of circuits do not allow review of 
prosecutorial discretion,399 it appears from the number of cases that 
have recently arisen regarding this issue that many defendants are 
unhappy with the sole discretion plea bargaining process. In a ma­
jority of sole discretion substantial assistance cases, defendants as­
sert that they have substantially assisted the prosecutor, yet go 
unrewarded-namely, the prosecution does not file a section 5Kl.l 
motion. To comply with a prosecutor's request for assistance, de­
fendants have gone undercover, risked the health and safety of 
themselves, turned in family and friends, given up personal prop­
erty, and subjected themselves to constant fear of bodily harm, all 
in the hopes of receiving a substantial assistance motion from the 
prosecutor.400 Even when a prosecutor refuses to grant the sub­
stantial assistance motion, the assistance the defendant has given 
can still be used by the prosecutor to investigate and prosecute 
others. 
The unfairness in situations such as these seems obvious. How­
ever, the non-reviewing circuits have stated that their hands are tied 
by the express language of the plea agreement--the government 
has the "sole discretion" to decide whether the defendant provided 
substantial assistance.401 While sympathetic to the defendant's 
plight, the courts refuse to intervene.402 Still, the government is 
398. See infra Part III.C for an examination of this alternative (or "back-door") 
clause. 
399. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the majority position. 
400. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1485 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting 
that the defendant and his brother testified against a drug dealer); United States v. 
Kahn, 920 F.2d 1100, 1103 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the defendant became an inform­
ant for the government). 
401. See Padilla v. United States, No. 95-1282, 1995 WL 590451, at *1 (8th Cir. 
Apr. 3, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (stating that the plaintiff had no right to a substan­
tial assistance motion). 
402. See United States v. Carter, 122 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
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free to use the defendant's information for whatever purpose it sees 
fit, regardless of whether the defendant gains any benefit.403 Not 
only has the government received valuable information, but it has 
also gained a conviction without a trial. In comparison, defendants 
lose their constitutional rights associated with prosecution and trial. 
Moreover, they have exposed themselves and their families to con­
stant fear of revenge for the information revealed. Finally, the fate 
of the defendants' sentences is determined by the subjective will 
of the government, and if no substantial assistance motion is filed, 
the rigid Guidelines. Taking into account the need for some prose­
cutorial discretion and the importance of the defendants' constitu­
tional rights, the following compromise would provide additional 
fairness to defendants and reign in prosecutors' broad and unfair 
discretion. 
All plea agreements that include a sole discretion clause should 
also be equipped with a "back door" escape for the defendant. The 
back door clause would provide the defendant with some decision­
making power by informing him or her of the prosecutor's decision 
concerning the substantial assistance motion and allowing him or 
her to make the next move. Thus, if the prosecutor decides that the 
defendant's information does not satisfy the government's substan­
tial assistance definition, the defendant may then withdraw his or 
her guilty plea and stand trial. The back door clause should also 
contain a provision that prohibits the use of information obtained in 
the plea bargaining process against the defendant. 
The following is an example of a possible "back door" clause: 
Option of Retention of Rights by Defendant in a Sole Discretion 
Plea Agreement404 
A) After reasonable interrogation(s) and giving the defend­
ant an opportunity to reveal all relevant information, and upon 
the defendant's guarantee that he/she has no further relevant in­
formation, the Government will assess the information received 
based upon the following factors: importance, relevance, content, 
truthfulness, danger to the defendant, depth, and coverage. 
Upon completion of an assessment of the factors in the preceding 
"[t]his is a difficult case because ... [of] the sympathetic considerations that [the de­
fendant] presents. But, ... they do not require of the district court a different exercise 
of discretion"). 
403. See id. at 476 (stating that it is "troubling" that the defendant provided infor­
mation that convicted two drug dealers but received no benefit because of his 
assistance). 
404. Only to be used in conjunction with the offering of a "sole discretion" sec­
tion 5K1.1 motion. 
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sentence, the Government will make a judgement in its sole dis­
cretion to either file the section 5K1.1 substantial assistance mo­
tion or not. If the Government is honestly satisfied with the 
information given by the defendant, the Government will file the 
section 5K1.1 motion requesting a downward departure and in­
form the defendant of its decision to do so. Upon the Govern­
ment's decision to file the section 5K1.1 motion, and notifying 
the defendant as such, the "back door" option terminates. 
B) After a review of the factors outlined in Paragraph (A), if 
the Government decides that the defendant did not provide sub­
stantial information, and therefore it has decided not to file a 
section 5K1.1 motion, the Government shall notify the defend­
ant. The defendant shall have five (5) days to decide to either 1) 
proceed with sentencing, knowing beforehand that the govern­
ment will not be filing a section 5K1.1 motion; 2) attempt to re­
veal further information; or 3) decide to execute the option to 
withdraw his/her plea of guilty, and cause the case to proceed to 
trial with a plea of not gUilty. None of the information that the 
defendant revealed during the plea agreement negotiations may 
be used against the defendant at trial, but the Government shall 
have the right to retain all information and use it as is seen fit so 
long as that use does not violate the above mentioned exception. 
C) The defendant may only execute the Option of Retention 
of Rights after the Government has denied the filing of a section 
5K1.1 motion. Once the defendant has executed the Option of 
Retention of Rights, no further plea agreement may be negoti­
ated with the Government in the future concerning the same 
charges. 
This type of clause benefits both the government and defend­
ants. Defendants retain the option to pursue their constitutionally 
protected rights by going to trial. Moreover, even though they have 
given up potentially important information (which cannot be used 
against them), they have removed some of the discretion bestowed 
upon the prosecutor. The prosecutor benefits by gaining poten­
tially important information that may be useful in prosecuting 
others, but is forced to offer the 5Kl.l motion for the assistance 
provided or risk going to trial. Thus, inserting this additional clause 
in plea agreements would allow the prosecutor to maintain sole dis­
cretion, the initial choice to file the section 5Kl.l motion, and the 
right to use the information from the defendant regardless of the 
defendant's actual conviction. In return, defendants retain their 
constitutional rights associated with trial, but are still forced to re­
veal the maximum amount of information they possess if they want 
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to retain the possibility of obtaining a sentencing reduction through 
a 5K1.1 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts are put in a difficult situation when confronted with a 
defendant who claims to have substantially assisted the prosecutor 
pursuant to a plea agreement, yet is not the recipient of a down­
ward departure motion. Most courts defer to the sole discretion 
language contained in the plea agreement and hold that the defend­
ant is without remedy despite possible blatant unfairness to the de­
fendant. Some courts, prompted by this unjust outcome, have 
examined the plea agreements and held that regardless of their 
criminal nature, they are in fact contracts to which contract princi­
ples apply when analyzing their enforceability. This acknowledg­
ment has led some courts to review the prosecutor's decision not to 
file the substantial assistance motion using the basic contract princi­
ples of good faith. 
Despite the acknowledgement of contract formation by some 
courts, a circuit split exists. The non-reviewing circuits have applied 
Wade v. United States ,405 and permit review of prosecutorial discre­
tion only if the motivation behind the prosecutor's decision was un­
constitutiona1.406 Conversely, the reviewing circuits have held that 
Wade is factually distinguishable and does not limit a court's right 
to use basic contract principles to review a prosecutor's decision not 
to file a substantial assistance motion.407 
Substantial assistance plea agreements are contracts and courts 
should examine their enforceability based on contract theory re­
strictions. Plea agreement formation and contract formation are 
identical, therefore justice requires that a defendant who is a party 
to a plea agreement be given the same protections as if he or she 
was a party to a contract. Although there are drawbacks to viewing 
a plea agreement as a contract, fairness to the defendant outweighs 
the potential risks to the efficiency of the justice system. 
The issue at hand will not be resolved until the United States 
Supreme Court decides a sole discretion substantial assistance case, 
although a statutory modification could ultimately resolve the cir­
405. 504 u.s. 181 (1992). 
406. See id. at 185-86; see also supra Part II.A for a discussion of the courts that 
do not review prosecutorial decisions for anything but unconstitutional motivations. 
407. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the courts that do allow review of 
prosecutorial decisions based on contract rights. 
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cuit split without becoming submerged in the underlying theoretical 
contract arguments. The solution is a compromise that ultimately 
would allow both parties to walk away from a plea agreement with 
some benefit, even if the agreement as a whole does not work out. 
While prosecutorial discretion is vital to the functioning of the judi­
cial system, at times its review is necessary in order ensure justice. 
Justin H. Dion 
